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CHAPTER I
A COMPETITIVE EVALUATION MODEL FOR WATER 
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
INTRODUCTION 
Objective of this Research
Water resources development is essential to the maintenance 
of national strength and the achievement of satisfactory levels of 
living. But development is very often limited by inadequate and 
misapplied capital, human and institutional resources. Since World 
War II the relative ineffectiveness of development efforts is es­
pecially blamed on the scarcity of resources [1]. Actually, if avail­
able resources were adequately allocated and utilized, it is possible 
that the outcome of the development could be greater. Hence the need 
of a better method for resources allocation is obvious.
Theoretically, for effective allocation of resource, evalua­
tion methodology for development planning is essential and important. 
Today, more adequate development planning is needed in developing 
countries. Evaluation procedures for development planning in more 
advanced countries have also reached a point where basic revision is 
needed. Therefore a search for a more effective evaluation method 
for resource development planning, in particular for water re­
sources, should be made. The main objective of this study is to 
search for such a method.
An evaluation methodology, designated as the competitive
evaluation model, was developed in this study by using terminologies
1
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usually employed exclusively in the theory of games. The model is 
mainly a collection of sets of games which are used to obtain com­
parison information between different water resources developments. 
These comparisons can be used to formulate recommendations for the 
decision-maker. Thus, the model as a whole may lead to a more ef­
fective evaluation procedure for water resources development planning.
Before the development of the model, a review of the present 
practices of water resources development planning evaluation was done. 
Later a study of the concepts of decision theory and game theory led 
to the development of the model. In the earlier stage of this re­
search, an attempt to use the heuristic (operational) gaming approach 
was also carried out but abandoned due to some of the limitations of 
this approach. All these will be discussed in this chapter and so 
are the sub-objectives of the model and its simple structure.
Present Practices of Water Resources 
Development Planning
Most of the recent concepts of water resources development 
planning are based on Senate Document No. 97 (1962), entitled as 
"Policies, Standards, and Procedures in the Formulation, Evaluation, 
and Review of Plans for Use and Development of Water and Related 
Land Resources" [2], which shall henceforth be referred to as S.D. 
No. 97. This document stated that the basic objective in the formu­
lation of plans is to provide the best use, or combination of uses, 
of water and related land resources to meet all forseeable short­
term and long-term needs. Since plan formulation and development 
evaluation are the two most essential steps for effective resources
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allocation and development, each of them will be discussed separ­
ately in the following.
Present Concepts of Plan Formulation
The current conception of plan formulation in water re­
sources development is usually made on individual basis. Develop­
ment is planned in isolation, and its relationship with other de­
velopments is either considered lightly or ignored. Most water re­
sources projects are the results of local or regional interest 
groups requesting one of the water resource agencies to solve a par­
ticular problem; and essentially this can be considered to be a com­
promise. In some cases, the agency can study the problem and do a 
limited amount of planning; these are usually rather small and 
limited projects. In other cases, the U. S. Congress must appropri­
ate funds to investigate a particular problem. After the appropri­
ation of funds, the problem is first studied, and then a plan to 
solve the immediate problem is formulated [3]- It is obvious that 
this kind of planning is a passive planning and can only solve short­
term or immediate problems. In order to achieve more effective long­
term development, an overall regional or national program to relate 
all individual developments is needed.
Recently, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers has been trying 
to change the approach of water resources development planning to 
planning-programming-budgeting systems (PPBS). As its name sug­
gests, it is an effort to tie forward planning to budgeting via 
programming. This system is used as a mechanism for assigning pri­
orities to proposed Corps' projects. The priority which a project
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receives is a function of a basin's needs and equity term for a given 
area. The needs of a basin are determined from the Corps' own esti­
mates of needed water resources development. The equity term is a 
function of several things including the amount of money for new pro­
jects the area has received in a five year period. In the current 
practices of this system, priorities are assigned to the list of 
Corps' projects which have been authorized by Congress. The Corps 
suggests that federal investments in regional water resources de­
velopment should eventually be made by such a system and that regional 
funds should be allocated to those programs for which priority can 
be estimated.
The attempt of allocating funds to projects which have estab­
lished priority is a right approach to planning. It is also necessary 
to have a systematic method for making this attempt more effective.
Present Development Evaluation Procedure
Currently, the evaluation of water resources development is 
based on a national income account by means of the benefit and cost 
ratio (B/C) analysis. This analysis uses the ratio of benefit pro­
duced by a project to the cost spent for the project. According to 
S.D. No. 97, benefits of a project are increases or gains in value 
of goods and services which result from conditions with the project, 
as compared with conditions without the project. Induced costs (all 
uncompensated, adverse effects caused by the construction and oper­
ation of a project) and associated costs (the value of goods and 
services over and above those included in project costs needed to
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make the immediate products or services of the project available) 
must be subtracted from benefits.
The actual method of measuring benefits of a project varies 
with the type of benefit being considered. Measure of water supply 
and water quality benefits are approximated by the cost of achieving 
the same results by the most likely alternative means that would be 
utilized in the absence of the project. Irrigation and navigation 
benefits are the net increase in income to those persons directly 
benefiting from the project. Flood control benefits are the reduc­
tions in property damage due to flooding. Recreation and fish and 
wildlife benefits are the value of the improvements as measured by 
the number of uses of the project times some unit value of the re­
creation.
Project costs are taken into account in two ways. In some 
cases, such as in projects involving irrigation, associated costs 
are deducted from the corresponding benefit. The second way involves 
considering costs which are more directly related to the project (the 
costs of construction, operation, loss of mineral production due to 
inundation, and relocation of transportation facilities). These costs 
are added to the cost of construction of the project. All project 
costs are expressed in monetary terms.
Basically, B/C ratio analysis seeks to overcome the short­
comings of the previous evaluation method which relies on measuring 
profits (net benefits) in public enterprises as the criteria for com­
parison of alternatives. The use of a ratio between benefits and 
costs, as opposed to a difference, is an attempt at approximating
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more closely the results of an analysis which employs benefits and 
costs.
The practice of using B/C analysis for development evalua­
tion is a suitable approach when only an individual development is 
considered and not the whole system. But, when an overall regional 
or national system which may include many developments is considered, 
a single analysis is not enough for effective evaluation, especially 
when this analysis consists of only monetary terms. There are many 
other factors to be considered, for example, needs to be fulfilled 
and efficiency achieved. Hence, more objectives and criteria should 
be sought to make the evaluation more effective.
Recently, the Water Resources Council has attempted to recti­
fy some of the inadequacies inherent in the current procedures of B/C 
analysis. And as a result of this, the Water Resources Council's 
Special Task Forces Report (commonly called the Blue Book) [4] has 
suggested the following additional account: a regional income ac­
count, an environmental account and a well-being account. The new 
regional income account would be similar to the national income ac­
count except that the B/C ratio would be net for the region instead 
of net for the nation. The environmental and well-being accounts 
would account for impacts of the project on the environment and on 
the well being of the nation respectively; however, no methodology 
has been developed for the implementation of these two accounts.
The three additional accounts would presumably have the same rela­
tive importance as the national income account has. As opposed to
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the use of the B/C ratio for evaluation, net benefits (benefits minus 
costs) are used in the formulation of individual projects. In gen­
eral, the goal of a planner is to maximize a project's net benefits 
while meeting whatever constraints he deems appropriate.
This approach of adding new accounts to evaluation proce­
dures is in the right direction towards more effective planning.
But it is also obvious that new methods for measuring these or any
other new accounts are needed.
Conclusion
The practice of considering water resources development in 
isolation and the problems in development evaluation procedure are 
a result of changes in the philosophy of federal expenditures. In 
the past, only economic analysis was considered in development
planning. It was usually the policy of the federal government to
fund water-related projects only if their benefits exceeded their 
costs. As time went on, more and more aspects of water resources 
development were taken into account. Today the policy of the govern­
ment is that every conceivable aspects of impact, from economic to 
social to ecological, should be taken into account. The current 
problems are not due to ill-conceived concepts; they are due to con­
tinual modification of sound methods to the point where basic re­
vision is needed [ 3].
As stated earlier, an effective evaluation procedure is only 
a means to attain a more effective development planning. Sometimes 
when the subject of evaluation is mentioned, it is linked to the
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approach of cost-effectiveness. Cost-effectiveness generally is 
referred to methodology used to optimize objectives under various 
constraints or alternatives [5]. In the past, the benefit and cost 
ratio analysis used in water resources development evaluation was 
mostly based on monetary measurement. As far as the current policy 
in water resources development planning is concerned, multiple ob­
jectives must also be considered in the planning. With the intro­
duction of the multiple objectives, some objectives may not be able 
to be measured in monetary terms. Therefore, any cost-effectiveness 
methodology used for water resources development planning evaluation 
should be extended beyond the measurement of monetary value to in­
clude other types of measurements. Especially when priorities of 
some of the objectives are considered, the method should also be 
able to include weights for the priorities in the formulation of the 
analysis. For example, if in some regions the development of water 
supply is regarded to be more urgent than recreational development, 
then priorities for water supply development should be accounted in 
the analysis; or, if a region needs more development than other re­
gions, then priority should be given to this region. Anyhow, any 
analysis used should be able to consider different objectives and 
measurements besides the economic factors based on monetary value.
Hence, a fresh approach which will respond to the current 
and probably future philosophy should be sought. In summary, to deal 
with the present problems, the new approach should at least be able 
to relate all individual developments under the overall system, to 
recognize proper priorities, and to augment new criteria and objectives
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to make the evaluation process more effective and, thus, more bene­
ficial to water resources development. Decision theory and game 
theory, which are sometimes used as cost-effectiveness techniques, 
and the heuristic gaming approach and their possible applications 
were studied and they will be discussed in the following.
Decision Theory and Its Application to 
Evaluation Problem
While reviewing the present practices of water resources 
development planning evaluation it was found that decision-making 
plays quite an important role in the whole process. This led to a 
brief study of the decision theory and its possible application to 
evaluation problems.
Decision theory, in general, is an approach for systematic 
and effective decision-making. In order to illustrate its princi­
ple a simple decision theory model by Kline [6] is shown in Fig. 
1.1. The main purpose of this model is to establish effective or 
system-worth criteria for system engineering. As it is shown in the 
figure, the model consists of a series of steps. A sub-model which 
establishes standards, solution methods, and evaluation criteria is 
first constructed before initial information is fed into this sub­
model. Next, alternative solutions are sought, and then analyzed 
or tested. Results from analysis are appraised by evaluation cri­
teria at the evaluation step which will lead to the final decision 
and thus generate new information. If any obtained decision being 
unsatisfactory, the optimization loop will make it possible to 




















Figure 1.1. A decision theory model.
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and to obtain an alternative solution. Of course, every time 
the optimization loop is used, it means a repetition of tlw wholte 
evaluation process.
Evaluation is usually a key step in a decision-making pro­
cess. Its primary purpose is to provide data in meaningful form 
to help a decision to be made. A decision is always a choice among 
alternatives, each of which will lead to a specific outcome. Eval­
uation is designated to help reducing the uncertainty of the outcome; 
or it may be looked at as a means for increasing the confidence 
level of the occurrence of a desired outcome.
It is believed that decision theory could be used as a proper 
means for leading to a more effective evaluation procedure for water 
resources development planning because the purpose of evaluation 
for water resources development planning is the same as those sug­
gested by the evaluation in decision theory. Furthermore, when im­
plementing concepts of decision theory in the present study, one can 
consider it to be a way of evaluating the worth of benefits received 
for the resources used and not simply a benefit-cost ratio analysis 
which is suggested in the present concept of water resources de­
velopment evaluation procedure.
In the decision-making process, an analytical method is 
usually needed to support effective systematic evaluation. For 
cxiuiiple, linear programming and dynamic programming are used to help 
decision making by optimizing the objectives under a set of con­
straints. Reid, Lawrance, and Law's "A Model for the Allocation of 
Funds for the Development of Water Resources" [3 ] is an example of
12
using integer and linear programming to support decision making. 
Raser [7 ] mentioned that mathematical theory of games, which is 
simply a set of statements about values and the logical consequence 
of basing decision on these values, is an excellent source of ideas 
for implementing decision theory. It will be noticed in the next 
section that game theory also has other features common to water re­
sources development problem. Therefore, the reasons and possibil­
ity of using game theory concepts in formulating an evaluation pro­
cedure will he explored next.
Game Theory and Its Application 
to Evaluation Problem
Theory of games is a study of conflict of interests. The 
modern mathematical approach to conflict of interests is generally 
attributed to Von Neumann and Morgenstem for their publication - 
'Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" [8 ]. This publication has 
been furnishing people with limited mathematical training an oppor­
tunity to understand the motivation, the reasoning, and the conclu­
sion of game theory. Hence, a growing interest in the scientific 
study of interest conflict resulted in the last several decades. As 
a reflection of this trend, one finds today that the study of in­
terest conflict, both among individuals and among institutions, is 
one of the more dominant concerns of at least several academic de­
partments, for example, economics, sociology, political science, and 
other areas to a lesser degree [9].
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The mathematical theory of games was originally created to 
provide a new approach to economic problems, Von Neumann and Morgea­
stern did not construct a theory simply as an appendage to take its
place on the periphery of economics as an afterthought. On the
contrary, they felt that "the typical problems of economic behavior 
become strictly identical with the mathematical notions of suitable
games of strategy." | 9|. f.’cajnple of interest conflict can be
easily found in economic situations. Bilateral monopoly (one buyer 
and one seller) and oligopoly (a few sellers) are typical examples 
of interest conflict |10J. Other situations of interest conflict 
can always be arranged into a format of a competitive game. In this 
game, each competitor is competing for results or solutions benefi­
cial to himself by using different strategies, though the possibility 
of getting proper solutions is mainly dependent upon the game arrange­
ment and the complexity of the original situation.
Water resources development planning evaluation is funda­
mentally an ecomomic problem with an interest conflict nature; and, 
lienee, it is amenable to the mathematical theory of games. Very often 
in the process of evaluation, comparisons are constantly made among 
alternatives which could be different regions, various levels of 
spending, several benefit categories, long-term and short-term effects, 
etc. These alternatives, or other components of development planning 
can be arranged into competitive games in which solutions are derived 
by using particular solution methods. These solutions can then be 
used as recommendation in the final decision making process.
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While discussing decision theory and its application to 
evaluation problems, it was concluded that an analytical method is 
needed to support effective evaluation. Now, since some charac­
teristics common to water resources development problems and game 
theory concepts have been recognized and application of game theory 
to development evaluation also seems to be possible, a competitive 
evaluation model aimed at more effective resources development 
planning based on game theory concepts will be developed in this 
study. An alternative to the analytical game theory approach, 
heuristic gaming,will be discussed first.
Heuristic (Operational) Gaming Approach 
to Water Resources Development Problem
Heuristic gaming is an alternative for analytical approach 
in the study of interest conflict problem. Sometimes when a complex 
competitive environment can not be cast into a formal mathematical 
model, the situation may be simulated as a heuristic game, in which 
human players enter the simulation system, act according to certain 
rules of thumb, and begin to manipulate the units and relationship 
in the structure. Raser [ 7] stated that heuristic gaming was once 
referred to as a "messing around" in science, but "messing around" 
is a legitimate way to increase knowledge. Anyhow, heuristic gaming 
does provide a powerful research tool for generating information and 
may enable one to shorter, thé-influential road for some types of de­
cision making. As a consequence, heuristic gaming has been used 
widely in many different fields, to name a few, war games, management
and business games, political science and international relations 
games, games in sociology, games in education, games in psychology, 
etc.
At an earlier stage of this study, thoughts were given to 
adapt a heuristic gaming approach for solving water resources plan­
ning problem. As a result of this, a water resources development 
game was set up. This game was a simulation of a river basin. Dif­
ferent aspects of activities on a river basin were formulated into 
the simulation. The game was played several times. Although the 
game provided useful insights into the way water resources are de­
veloped in a river basin, it was not suitable to be used for studying 
complicated and large-scale development planning problems. With 
further planning and detailed simulation, heuristic gaming approach 
may possibly be used in future research. At the present moment, the 
theoretically justified game theory concepts will be employed to de­
velop the competitive evaluation model in this study.
Objectives of the Competitive 
Evaluation Model
As stated earlier, the main objective of the competitive 
evaluation model is to establish a more effective evaluation method­
ology for helping water resources development planning. To achieve 
the main objective, a set of sub-objectives of the model is also ex­
plicitly defined in the following :
1, To be able to identify the following situations in 
water resources development:
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a. The overall system of water resources development 
as well as individual or local development.
b. The relationship of water resources developments 
in different locations or regions.
c. The inter-relationship between different purposes 
or goals of water resources development.
d. Priorities among different purposes and locations 
of water resources development.
2. To be able to recognize the competitive nature of water 
resources development.
3. In addition to the measurements of benefit and cost used 
in the present evaluation procedure, to be able to augment new mea­
surements, for ex^ple, effectiveness, long-term and short-term 
needs, etc.
4. To be able to provide systematic and specific recommend­
ations for the decision-maker in order to benefit water resources 
development.
5. The model proposed must also be simple enough to be 
practically applicable.
The last sub-objective of the model is specially mentioned 
here because very often these days theoretical techniques intro­
duced for some analysis are so ideally and esthetically developed 
that their application may not be too realistic after all.
Structure of the Model
The competitive evaluation model is mainly a collection of 
sets of games. The structure of the model is quite simple. As it
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is shown in Fig. 1.2, in the model there are several sets of games. 
Each set of games represents an evaluation criterion. In other 
words, all comparison information is centered around a particular 
evaluation measurement within a set. Each set has its individual 
games which supply comparison information. Each individual game 
has several components which include players, strategies, payoffs, 
etc. A great portion of the effort for this study was spent in the 
development of these individual game components because they are 
the backbone of the model. The main purpose of this model will be 
to collect and interpret comparison information from games in each 
set and then to use this information to formulate recommendations 
for decision making.
To be more specific about what the model does, the general 
idea of the model's application in evaluation of water resources de­
velopment planning will be discussed here. In the verification of 
the model, several evaluation criteria, which categorize the sets of 
games, are introduced. These criteria are the measurements of the 
percent of effectiveness, the percent of needs met, the long-term 
total objective , and the short-term objective comparisons of water 
resources development planning between different water resources 
basins in the United States. The detail of these criteria will be 
explained later. Under each criterion which heads a set of games, 
games between different water resources basins were arranged so that 
comparison information among various types of development in differ­
ent basins can be obtained. Of course, all comparison information 
are generated from individual games and they are collected and
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The competitive evaluation model 
- A collection of sets of games
Set of games - representing an 
evaluation criterion
Interpretation of comparison 
information
Recommendation for the decision­
maker
Comparison information generated 
from games
Individual game - generating 
comparison information
Game components - representing 
different aspects of a game: - 
different players, strategies, 
payoffs, etc.
Figure 1.2. Structure of the competitive evaluation model,
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interpreted under each evaluation criterion. This information 
could be used to formulate recommendations for decision making.
The model made no effort to show how exactly water resources 
should be developed in the United States; it only offers the de­
cision-maker the comparisons of various types of development 
planning between basins under different evaluation criteria.
Since all comparison information is obtained from indiv­
idual games which are based on game theory concepts, a brief review 
of game theory concepts will be done next before discussing the de­
velopment of the model.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF GAME THEORY CONCEPTS
It was mentioned in the introduction that the competitive 
evaluation model was developed by using game theory concepts. There­
fore, a review of some basic game theory concepts will be done in 
this chapter.
Generally, game theory is the study of conflict of interests. 
Conflicting situations between two or more opponents are usually ar­
ranged into a competitive game. These opponents are referred to as 
the players of the game. The alternative actions which the players 
can maneuver in the process of a game are called stiategies. During 
or at the end of a game, the payments transferred from one player to 
another, or simply received by a player, are called payoffs. The 
summation of payoffs a player receives during the game is designated 
as the value or solution of the game. The values of a game can be 
positive or negative depending on whether one gains or loses.
Luce and Raiffa [9] state that a game usually assumes one 
of the following three forms: the extensive form, the normal form,
and the characteristic function form. To illustrate a conflict situ­
ation the extensive form employs game tree diagrams to show the step 
by step competition between the competitors. A payoff matrix which 
arranges payoffs of a game into a rectangular array in rows and
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columns is usually used in the normal form. Due to the fact that 
payoff matrix illustrates a competitive situation better than other 
methods, normal form is generally favored in studying basic game 
theory concepts. Characteristic function form very often involves 
theoretical mathematical functions, and hence is more complicated.
To study theory of games, one can divide the topics according 
to whether it is zero-sum or non-zero-sum, and according to the 
number of players in a game. A game is called zero-sum if the sum 
of payoffs which all players receive at the end of the game is equal 
to zero. Non-zero-sum is the opposite of zero-sum; i.e., the pay­
offs received by all players at the end of a game do not sum up to 
zero. The zero-sum nature of a game indicates a strictly competitive 
situation between the players of the game whereas ncn-zero-sum im­
plies that there may still be some co-operative characteristics re­
maining for the opponents. Since two-person zero-sum, two-person 
non-zero-sum, and n-person games are the basic types of games, each 
of them will be discussed separately in the following.
Two-person Zero-sum Games
Two-person zero-sum games play a central role in the whole 
theory of games. In each game, the gain of one player signifies an 
equal loss to the other player. Usually the outcomes of the game 
are expressed in terms of the payoffs of one player. A payoff matrix 
for a two-person zero-sum game is shown in Fig. 2.1. In this matrix, 
the players of the game are represented by A and B. Player A has m 
strategies while player B has n strategies. Player A*s strategies
22
Player B's Strategies
B, B _ B _ B . B
1 2 3 J n
A l ^ 1 1 ^ 1 2 ^ 1 3  •*
. a ^ .  ..
^ i n
^ 2 ^ 2 1 ^ 2 2 ^ 2 3  •• * ^ 2 3  • ^ 2n
A 3 ^ 3 1 ^ 3 2 ^ 3 3 • ^ 3 j ' • ^ 3 n
A i ^ i l ^ 2 ^ 1 3  " ^ i j "  ^ i n
A m \ l
. .
^ m 2 \ 3  •
» . a  . . 








Figure 2.1. Payoff matrix of two-person zero-sum game.
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are designated as , A^, A^, A^, whereas player 3's
strategies are those of B^, B^, B ^ B ^ .  If player A
chooses the ith row strategy A^ and player B chooses the jth column 
strategy B^, then the payoffs, in this case designated in terms of 
player A's payoffs, are indicated by the payoff coefficients which 
are â ĵ for player A and -a^j for player B.
The objective of a game is for each player to choose his 
strategies so that the outcome of a game will be most beneficial to 
himself. Since both players are trying to get the most gains, the 
solution of a game is usually the value upon which both players 
would agree.
Different techniques can be used to solve two-person zero- 
sum games. Several solution methods will be mentioned. They mainly 
belong to either the use of pure strategy or mixed strategies.
Since the detail procedures of these solution methods can be found 
in the references and most of them were found not to be suitable 
for direct use in the competitive evaluation model, they will not be 
discussed at length here. A dominance property which raises some 
problem later on in the development of the competitive evaluation 
model will also be mentioned here.
Pure Strategy
Pure strategy usually indicates that a player who may have 
several strategies in a game will use only a single prescribed strate­
gy to obtain a final solution. Dresher [11] stated that pure strategy 
can be used to solve games with a saddle point. A saddle point is a 
point in the payoff matrix and it will lead to a solution which
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satisfies both players of the game. When using pure strategy to 
solve games, the minimax (or maximum) criterion is usually employed 
to pick out the strategies. The criterion expressed a conservative 
attitude which guarantees the best of the worst results. The two 
corresponding strategies used by each player are called "optimal" 
strategies. The saddle point is given by the common entry to these 
"optimal" strategies. The payoff in this common entry is called 
the "optimal" value of the game. "Optimality" here signifies that 
neither player is tempted to change his strategy since his opponent 
can counteract by selecting another strategy which will yield a worse 
payoff than the one given him through the minimax (or maximum) cri­
terion.
Mixed Strategies 
For games without saddle point, the two players can not use 
pure strategies to reach the optimal value. This is true since 
each player can improve his outcomes by selecting a different strate­
gy-
The failure of the pure strategies to give an optimal solu­
tion to a game has led to the idea of using mixed strategies [14]. 
Each player, instead of playing his pure strategies only, will play 
all his strategies according to a predetermined set of ratios. The 
general concept of mixed strategies is described in the following.
Let X,, X„, ..., X., ..., X and Y,, Y„, ..., Y., ..., Y be two sets 1 2  1 m 1 2  j n
of ratios, such that




]=nI Y = 1 (2.1)
j=l :
where X̂ >̂ 0 and >.0 for all i and j . If player A has strategies
Ag, A^, A^, and player B has strategies B^,
B^, then for the mixed strategies, player A will use strategy
Aĵ a fraction of the time, strategy A^ a fraction X^ of the
time, strategy A^ a fraction X^ of the time and so on, and player
B will use strategy B̂  a fraction Y^ of the time, strategy Bg a
fraction Y_ of the time, and strategy B. a fraction Y. of the time
1 1
and so on. The ratios X^ and Ŷ  may be regarded as the probabilities 
by which players A and B select their i^^ and pure strategies, 
respectively. The solution of a game employing mixed strategies is 
defined as the following:
i=m




' ' j " "
where a^^ are payoff coefficients.
There are several methods for solving mixed strategies in 
two-person zero-sum games. According to Williams [12], the "Oddment" 
method can be used for solving games with small dimensions. Graphi­
cal methods [13] which usually gives vivid illustration can be used 
to solve two-person zero-sum games. For games of any dimensions,
Taha [21] states that linear programming can be used to obtain solu­
tions .
26
As stated earlier, the solution of a game is usually called 
the value of a game. This value is the outcome upon which all 
players agree. The theory of two-person zero-sum games is unusual 
in that it enables one to find solutions which are universally ac­
cepted, In actual problems that arise in every day life, competi­
tive games usually do not lead themselves to straightforward 
answers. This indicates that using two-person zero-sum game approach 
to solve real life problem is very unrealistic.
Dominance Property
When solving games, Karlin [15] states that the so called 
"dominance property" should be taken into account. This property 
occurs when one or more of the strategies of either players can be 
deleted because they are inferior to the remaining ones and hence 
will never be employed. In such cases, it is said that the deleted 
strategies are dominated by superior ones. The superiority of a 
strategy is usually shown by the payoff coefficients of a game. For 
example, a strategy Ag is superior to another strategy A^ if and 
only if the followings hold true for their payoff coefficients:
&gj 2. \j for all j,
where a . = payoff coefficients for strategy A ,SJ 5
a^j = payoff coefficients for strategy and 
j is the sub-script indicating the other player's strategy.
The dominance property can be used to reduce the size of 
games and hence the computation effort involved. But if a game has 
two dominant superior strategies, one for each player, it will be
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resolved into a simple competition between the two superior strate­
gies. This is one of the problems which arised in developing the 
payoff matrix for games in the competitive evaluation model. To 
deal with such problems, a new algorithm was developed in this 
study. It will be discussed later.
Two-person Non-zero-sum Games
A non-zero-sum game is different from a zero-sum game in 
that payoffs of the game are denoted for both players. This is 
necessary because the gain of one player may not be the loss of 
another player. A payoff matrix for a two-person non-zero-sum game 
is shown in Fig. 2.2. This matrix is almost the same as the one 
shown for two-person zero-sum game except that payoffs are shown 
for both players. Each entry of the payoff matrix includes two 
items, the first one â j for player A and second one b^^ for player 
B.
Two-person zero-sum games come up in many different contexts, 
but they always have the same basic structure. By looking at the 
payoff matrix, one can pretty well tell "the whole", This is not 
the case in non-zero-sum games. Besides the payoff matrix, there 
are many "rules of the game" that markedly affect the character of 
the game, these rules must be spelled out before one can talk about 
the basis of the payoff matrix alone.
Methods for solving two-person non-zero-sum games have been 
introduced by different people. Nash [16] offeres a method. He 








Figure 2.2. Payoff matrix of two-person non^zero-sum game.
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the task is to give a formal definition of a bargaining problem 
and to solve it. His approach is to select a starting point which 
is agreed by all the players for bargaining, and proceed from 
there to arrive at a set of solutions.
Davis [17] offers a method which employs techniques used 
for solving two-person zero-sum games to solve non-zero-sum game.
His method suggests that by isolating the payoffs of the other 
player, game value is obtained for one player. This is done for 
both players. And, then, these two game values are used as the 
lower limits leading to outcomes upon which both players will agree. 
This method is essentially the same as the one suggested by Nash 
except that the bargaining point is analytically calculated. Most 
of the methods introduced by others are similar to the ones dis­
cussed here.
Davis [17] states that the outcomes of two-person games may 
depend on the ways of communication, the effect of imperfect infor­
mation, the effect of restricting alternatives, whether threats 
are allowed, binding agreement and side payment, etc. Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern [ 8] argue that the actual selection of an outcome 
of a two-person non-zero-sum game depends upon certain psychological 
aspect of the players. They contend that further speculation in 
this direction is not of a mathematical nature, at least not with 
the present mathematical abstraction.
In conclusion, for most non-zero-sum games with any complex­
ity, there is no universally accepted solution; that is, there is no 
single strategy which is clearly preferably to the others, nor is
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there a single clear-cut, predictable outcome. Therefore, one will 
have to be content with something less than the unequivocal solu­
tion one obtained for zero-sum games.
N-person Games
Due to the complexity of games, studies on n-person games 
are admitted to be less satisfactory than two-person games. As the 
name suggested, n-person games involve more players in a game. The 
first problan encountered in n-person games is the difficulty of 
arranging the conflicting situation between players into a proper 
competitive formulation. Then, there are many more factors to be 
considered, for example, the problem of coalitions between players, 
the superadditivity properties of payoffs, individual rationality 
among players, etc.
Different methods have been attempted for solving n-person 
games, yet so far they are all unsatisfactory. One particular method 
introduced by Churchman, Ackoff and Arnoff [18] uses coalition formation 
between players to simplify the problem into two-person games and 
proceed from there. Since there are a number of players in each 
game, different coalitions will lead to different solutions. From 
the start. Von Neumann and Morgerstern [17] gave up any hope of 
finding a single payoff solution for all n-person games. They as­
serted that the only reasonable solution is a variety of alterna­
tives, which will probably all express some general principles but 
nevertheless differ among themselves in many particular respects.
They also felt that the existence of many alternatives, far from 
being a defect of the theory, is in fact an indication that the
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theory has the flexibility necessary to deal with the wide diver­
sity one encounters in real life.
Summary
Generally, in the application of game theory, after identi­
fying the opponents and their strategies of a conflicting situation, 
a competitive game is first formulated. Next, payoffs derived from 
using different strategies by each player are sought. In the case 
of two-person zero-sum games, the solution of a game is then ob­
tained by employing a particular solution method. In other cases, 
for example, two-person non-zero-sum games or n-person games, a so­
lution set which includes different alternatives is sought and, then, 
special alternatives are selected and applied to the specially re­
quired situation. In conclusion, two-person games are usually 
easier to handle and solutions are more readily accepted than the 
more complicated n-person games which, so far, often depend on coali­
tion formation to obtain solutions.
Scope of Games in the Competitive Evaluation Model
Games in the competitive evaluation model are developed by 
using some game theory concepts mentioned in this chapter. Due to 
the fact that n-person games are usually quite complex and do not 
give a solution which would please all players, it was decided to 
use only the simple two-person games throughout the model. Since 
games in the model are used for the purpose of obtaining comparison 
information which will later be used to formulate recommendations 
for the evaluation of water resources development planning, the
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strictly competitive situation between opponents of zero-sum games 
is not the nature of games in the model. Hence, games considered 
in the model will all be non-zero-sum and payoffs will be denoted 
for both players of a game. The normal form of a game which employs 
payoff matrix to indicate the competition will be used in the model, 
because payoff matrix summarizes all payoffs of a game into a single 
matrix and thus clearly illustrates the whole conflicting situation.
A new algorithm was developed to solve games in the model. 
This was done because the two-strategy (one for each player) domi­
nance problem occurred consistently during the development of the 
payoff matrix of games in the model and none of the existing solu­
tion methods seems to be suitable for solving games in such situa­
tion. Although the new algorithm is completely different from the 
existing solution methods, it is still based on the method of solving 
two-person non-zero-sum games by isolating one player's payoffs 
and then obtaining a solution for the other players. The detailed 
development of this new algorithm will be explained in the next 
chapter as is the development of the model itself.
CHAPTER III
General Development of the Competitive Evaluation Model
The objectives of this study and the competitive evaluation 
model were stated in Chapter 1. In Chapter 11, a brief review of 
the basic game theory concepts was done. The purpose of this 
chapter is to describe the development of the competitive evalua­
tion model. It will be done in a very general format. The more 
detailed application of the model to the evaluation of water re­
sources development planning will be discussed in the next chapter.
General Description of the Model
The model is basically a collection of sets of games. Since 
the purpose of the model is for evaluation of water resources de­
velopment planning, each set of games represents an evaluation cri­
terion. The number of sets in the model is depended on the number 
of evaluation criteria determined by the decision-maker. To bring 
out the emphasis on a particular evaluation criterion, an objective 
priority weighting factor can be applied to the results of a set of 
games.
Each set has a number of games which are used to generate 
comparison information . In this study, the comparison information 
was specially aimed at water resources development in different 
water resources basins in the United States. Within each set of 
gajncs, a game, or basin, priority weighting factor can be used to
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bring out the priority of a game. To be more specific, this factor 
is intended for sounding out the development priority of a certain 
water resources basin.
Games in a set are actually the main component of the model. 
These games are developed using game theory concepts. Many of the 
components of games in this model are terms from traditional game 
theory, for example, player, strategy, payoff matrix, payoff coef­
ficient, etc. A new term, the utility number of a strategy (UNS), 
and a new algorithm for solving games are the special features of 
the games in this model. In this study, players of games are used 
to represent water resources basins in the United States and their 
strategies are various types of water resources development. Strate­
gies of a player also have their weighting factor and they are used, 
in this model, to bring out the special needs of certain types of 
water resources development in a basin, for example, the urgent need 
of flood control or irrigation development in a particular basin.
Solutions for each game are first found. They are compared 
within a set of games before being compared with solutions from 
other sets of games. All solutions are then interpreted and used as 
guideline to establish recommendation for the decision-maker in the 
evaluation of water resources development planning.
Sets of Games in the Model 
liach set of games in the competitive evaluation is headed 
by an evaluation criterion. The purpose of these criteria is to 
measure the objectives of various types of water resources develop­
ment in different water resourses basins in the United States. The
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number of sets of games in the model is quite flexible and is de­
cided by the decision-maker. In other words, the number of evalu­
ation criteria allowed in the model is not restricted in the sense 
that if a decision requires more detailed analyzed information, 
then more sets of games should be included in the model. Usually it 
is the case that the more sets of games are considered, the more in­
formation will be generated for the decision-maker assuming that the 
information thus obtained is not redundant or overlapping. This un- 
restrictiveness of the number of sets of games in the model is in­
troduced to compensate the past practice of using only benefit and 
cost ratio analysis as the single criterion in the evaluation pro­
cedure of water resources development. Earlier it was stated that 
new objectives of water resources development should be explored. 
Using this concept of permitting flexible number of evaluation cri­
teria, whenever new objectives need to be considered, their results 
of evaluation can always be added to the original evaluation results.
In this study, four evaluation criteria which will be dis­
cussed in the next chapter, are introduced. They are the measure­
ments of the long-term total objective, the short-term objective, 
the percent of effectiveness, and the percent of needs met. These 
evaluation criteria are introduced only for demonstration purpose 
and by no means are they representing a complete evaluation.
In each set of games, there are individual games which are 
the source of the comparison information. Therefore a great portion 
of the remaining of this chapter will be devoted to the development 
of the individual games in the model.
36
Games in the Model 
Games are the main component of the competitive evaluation 
model. The objective of games in the model is to generate compari­
son information between players. This is a little different from 
the traditional use of games which usually only denotes competition 
between two opponents. Hence, it may be more appropriate to call 
the competition of a game in this model the comparison, or even 
more precisely related to this model, the competitive evaluation. 
However, all these terms have been and will be used interchangeably 
throughout this report.
Earlier, the general concepts of games have been discussed. 
Terminology of traditional game theory will be retained in this 
study. Nevertheless, it is possible that interpretation of these 
terms, or components, of games may be different from their tradition­
al meaning. Besides, some new terms have been introduced. The 
greatest change for game in this model is the use of a new algorithm 
to replace the traditional method for solving games. Each component 
and the new algorithm will be discussed in the following.
Players of Games 
Since games in the competitive evaluation model are used for 
obtaining comparison information, players of a game naturally repre­
sent the two parties for whom comparisons are being sought. No fixed 
rule is set for the selection of players or the number of their ap­
pearances. Players can always be arranged into a competitive game if 
comparison information between them is needed. Of course, whenever 
two players appear in the same game, they should at least have some
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common characteristic or some common ground to be compared.
In this study, the players of games are used to represent water re­
sources basins in the United States.
Since only two-person games are used in this model, if 
comparisons between more than two players are needed, they can only 
be derived indirectly from repeated competitions. One way of doing 
this is to arrange one player as the standard player so that all 
other players can compete with this particular player to obtain all 
the comparisons needed between all players. This is the method 
used in this study.
The Basic Payoff Matrix
The format of game payoff matrix in the competitive evalua­
tion model is basically the same as the one shown earlier for two- 
person non-zero-sum games except that one more term is added to the 
matrix. This additional term, the utility number of a strategy 
(UNS), and the development of the matrix will be explained later. 
Figure 3.1 shows the basic payoff matrix of a game in the model. A 
and B represent the two players of the game. Player A has m strate­
gies designated by A^'s, for i = l, 2, ..., m; whereas player B's n 
strategies are designated by Bj's, for j =1, 2, ..., n. Associated 
with each strategy, there is a specific utility number (UNS). For 
example, Û ĵ is the utility number for player A's strategy and 
Uĵ j is the utility number for player B's strategy Bj . The sub­
scripts ai and bj of the utility numbers are used to indicate that 
the utility numbers belong to strategies A^ and Bj, respectively.
The coefficients of the payoff matrix (CPM) are shown in the same
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Figure 3.1. Payoff matrix of games in the competitive evaluation model.
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way as those shown earlier for two-person non-zero-sum games; i.e., 
the first term aij of the payoff coefficient (aij, bij) belongs to 
player A and the second one, bij, belongs to player B.
Strategies of Games 
Any player of a game in the competitive evaluation model 
will have a number of strategies to be manipulated. Usually in 
game theory, a strategy is a complete description of how one will 
behave under every possible circumstance; it has no connotation 
of cleverness. Since games in the model are used for obtaining com­
parison information between players under a particular evaluation 
criterion, strategies will represent different aspects on which com­
parisons are needed to be made. In this study, outcomes of various 
types of water resources development, for example, development of 
flood control, irrigation, navigation, etc., will be used as the 
strategies when comparison information between water resources basins 
are sought,
In this model, it is assumed that the number of strategies 
available to a player is finite. For instance, in the payoff matrix 
shown eadier, player A has m strategies and player B has n strategies. 
The number of strategies a player can have is totally depended on 
the types of games one is involved.
In the same game or in the same sot of games, it is necessary 
that strategics used by each player are similar in nature although 
they may not be identical or equivalent in number. Otherwise compar­
ison will not be able to be made. But it is permissible for players 
to have different types of strategies in different setsof games; i.e..
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players can have one type of strategy in games under an evaluation 
criterion and other types of strategy in games under another evalu­
ation criterion.
The Utility Number of Strategy (UNS)
The utility number of strategy shown earlier in the basic 
payoff matrix of games in this model is used to measure the absolute 
payoff or outcome of a strategy under a certain evaluation criterion. 
This newly introduced term is not usually indicated in conventional 
game payoff matrix. Although the derivation of the utility number 
of a strategy may involve the consideration of its relationship with 
the utility numbers of the other strategies of the same player or 
even those of the opponent, the magnitude of the utility number of a 
strategy is only relevant to this particular strategy. Utility 
number is not a relative payoff derived after considering two strate­
gies belonging to two different players like the payoff coefficient 
which will have its derivation explained in the next section. In 
other words, the derivation of the utility number of a strategy is 
usually independent of other strategies,
A strategy may have several UNS's, each one of them being 
the measurement of the absolute payoff or outcome of this strategy 
under a particular criterion. For example, in this study, various 
types of water resources development are designated as strategies 
for the basin-players and under each evaluation criterion there is 
a special utility number for each type of development.
The derivation of the UNS's is difficult to be clearly ex­
plained unless the strategy and the evaluation criterion are
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definitely defined. Hence, it will be more explicitly explained in 
the next chapter in the application of the competitive evaluation 
model for evaluation of water resources development planning when 
all the strategies and evaluation criteria are definitely defined.
Utility number is one of the main input of games in the 
competitive evaluation model. It will be used to procure payoff 
coefficients of a game.
Coefficients of the Payoff Matrix (CPM)
To develop the coefficients of the payoff matrix (CPM) for 
a game so that they will be reflecting real life situation and 
quantitatively usable in the competitive evaluation model has been 
a time consuming effort. In game theory texts, the derivation of 
the CPM's has seldom been clearly explained. In some cases, the co­
efficients were just arbitrarily arranged into the matrix without 
even considering whether they reflect any reasonable real life sit­
uation. Hence, it was necessary in this study to develop a method 
for obtaining payoff coefficients for games in the competitive eval­
uation model.
So far in the development of games for the model, the main 
information available in the payoff matrix is the utility number 
(UNS), or the absolute payoff, of each strategy, and it was intended 
to use them to procure the coefficient of the payoff matrix (CPM).
As it was stated earlier, utility number of a strategy is a measure 
of the outcome for a strategy and it is only relevant to this parti­
cular strategy. But a CPM is usually the resultant derived from two 
strategies belonging to the two different players of a game. There-
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fore, it is necessary to use the utility numbers of two strategies, 
each one belonging to a player of a game, to obtain a payoff coef­
ficient.
An earlier attempt was to use the difference of two utility 
numbers as the payoff coefficients. For instance, if is the 
utility number for player A's strategy A^ and U^j is the utility 
number for player B's strategy Bj, then the payoff coefficients cor­
responding to strategies A^ and Bj are as follows:
H j  = ^ai " for player A,
and
bij = Uyj - Uai for player B.
This can be interpreted as if and Uyj represent the benefit 
gains for strategies A^ and Bj, respectively, then â j is the net 
benefit gain for player A's strategy Ai over those of player B's 
strategy Bj. This method of calculating CPM is in agreement with 
the practice of evaluating water resources development by finding 
the net benefits, although in this case the benefit obtained from 
using one player's strategy over those of another player's strategy 
is calculated instead of the difference between the benefit and 
the cost.
The practice of comparing outcomes of two strategies is es­
sential in the competitive evaluation model. But the approach of 
using the differences of two utility numbers as payoff coefficients 
led to the fact that player A's payoff coefficient a^j would be equal 
to the negative of player B's payoff coefficient b^j. This indicates 
that the net gain of one player is equal to the net loss of another,
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then a zero-sum game appeared. At the same time, since, payoff coef­
ficients ajj and have the same units as utility numbers and 
Uyj, game values from different games will have different units at­
tached to them. Thus, it would be quite difficult to combine results 
from different games for further comparison.
Finally it was decided that payoff coefficients should be 
the ratios of two utility numbers instead of their differences. And 
the payoff coefficients are defined as follows:
“ij “ t C  '’ij “ "  “ai * ° “bj * °bj ai
(3.1)
a. . = 0 and b. . = 0 , if U . = 0 or U, . = 0ij ij ai bj
where a^. = the payoff coefficient for player A by using strategy A^,
b^j = the payoff coefficient for player B by using strategy Bj,
Uai = utility number for player A's strategy A^,
Uĵ j = utility number for player B's strategy Bj.
The reason for using the ratio of two utility numbers of 
different strategies belonging to the two opponents of a game as the 
payoff coefficients has its root in benefit-cost analysis which, as 
it was mentioned earlier, has been used for evaluation of water re­
sources development. Although in the benefit-cost analysis the 
ratio is between the benefit and the cost, whereas the ratio in the 
present case is between two utility numbers which could represent 
two benefit gains, two costs, or some other measurements.
This approach for obtaining payoff coefficients also has 
the following advantages:
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(i) The comparisons of game values from different games 
will be made possible. Since utility numbers and Uyj in a 
particular game always have the same units, the division of by 
Uyj or vice versa will make the payoff coefficients aĵ j and b^j an 
unitless quantity which in turn will be used to obtain unitless 
game values. Thus, game values from a set of games or from differ­
ent sets of games can later be combined for further comparisons to 
give systematic recommendations for the decision-maker.
(ii) The division of one utility numbers by another will 
also achieve the purpose of competitive evaluation. In the process of 
obtaining payoff coefficients, one player is using another player's 
utility number as an evaluation or measuring basis to arrive at 
one's payoff coefficient. For example, player A's payoff coefficient 
a^j, which is equal to > can be interpreted as the gain for 
player A by using strategy A^ per unit gain for player B by using 
strategy Bj; and player B's payoff coefficient b^j, which is equal
to indicates the gain for player B by using strategy Bj per
unit gain for player A by using strategy Aĵ . From this practice of 
obtaining payoff coefficients through mutually competitive measuring 
of utility numbers, the competitive nature of games in the competi­
tive evaluation model is once again emphasized.
Although the method used to obtain payoff coefficients has 
its advantages, a problem which brings difficulty in obtaining solu­
tions for a game also arises from the method. It is the dominance 
problem and it will be discussed next.
45
Dominance Problem 
Due to the method used to develop payoff coefficients for 
games in the competitive evaluation model, the dominance problem 
occurs for both player's strategies in every game. The dominance 
problem, as it was stated earlier, occurs when one or more strate­
gies of either players of a game can be deleted because they are 
inferior to the remaining ones and hence will never be employed.
It is said that the deleted strategies are dominated by the super­
ior ones. The superiority of a strategy is usually shown by its 
payoff coefficients. In this model, utility numbers are used to 
measure the absolute payoffs of a strategy and payoff coefficients 
are derived from utility numbers. Hence the dominance of a strate­
gy originates from utility numbers. For example,
if "as i  "at '
Uoc Urnt
then a . = r:— —  = a . for all j,
^  bj bj ^
where = utility number for player A's strategy Ag,
= utility number for player A's strategy A^,
= utility number for player B's strategy Bj,
a . = payoff coefficient for strategy Ag,5J
a^j = payoff coefficient for strategy A^,
and j is the sub-script indicating player B's strategy. In this 
example, the dominance of strategy A^ by strategy Ag is shown by 
their payoff coefficients (â j >. a^j) which originate from 
utility numbers (Uas —  ̂ at^•
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The dominance problem happened to games in this model is 
also the two-strategy dominance case. The two-strategy dominance 
is the situation in which two strategies, one from each player, 
arc superior to all other strategies and thus it will resolve a 
game into a simple competition between these two superior strate­
gies. For example, considering all the utility numbers for 
player A's strategies Aĵ in a game, if U^g > Uai for all i such that
i ^ s, then strategy Ag which has utility number U^g will dominate
all other strategies of player A; for the same reason, considering 
all utility numbers Uyj for player B's strategies , If U^^>Ubj 
for all j such that j ^ t, then all strategies Bj of player B will be 
dominated by strategy B^ which has utility number Hence, both
player A and B have a superior strategy, Ag for player A and Bj. for 
player B, which dominated all their other strategies, and the game is
resolved into a competition between these two strategies, Ag and Bj-.
Consequently, the two-strategy dominance problem has led to 
the development of a new algorithm for solving games in the compe­
titive evaluation model. Following the traditional meaning of games 
and their solution methods, the occurrence of the two-strategy domi­
nance indicates that each player will use only their superior strate­
gies for competing in a game, i.e., the use of pure strategy. Since 
games in this model are arranged for obtaining comparison informa­
tion between water resources basins through the use of different 
types of water resources development as strategies, the occurrence 
of two-strategy dominance will mean the comparison between only two 
types of water resources development which are represented by the
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two strategies with the highest utility numbers. But it was not 
intended to use one single superior development (strategy) to claim 
that all other developments (represented by other strategies in the 
game) of the same basin are better or worse than those of another 
basin; and this is just what the two-strategy dominance suggested 
in ordinary solution methods of games. Therefore, the conventional 
solution method for games will not be used and a new algorithm for 
solving games will be developed in this study to meet the purpose 
of games in the competitive evaluation model.
Game Solution Method 
The Originally Intended Method
According to the original plan, if payoff coefficients could 
be developed without the occurrence of the two-strategy dominance 
problem, it was intended to apply techniques used for solving two- 
person zero-sum games to solve all the two-person non-zero-sura games 
in this model. Because there are generally no argument concerning 
the validity of solutions in two-person zero-sum games, and, thus, 
solutions derived are satisfied by all players of a game.
A method proposed earlier for solving games in this model 
was to find game value for a player by only considering his own 
payoff coefficients in the matrix. In other words, by isolating the 
other player's payoff coefficients in the matrix, game values are 
obtained for each player of a two-person non-zero-sum game by using 
solution methods for two-person zero-sum games. Thus, there will 
be two game values from every game, one for each player. These two 
game values of a non-zero-sum game represent what the minimum or 
guaranteed gain a player will get by using pure or mixed strategies.
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Since the purpose of games in this model is to obtain in­
formation generated from the comparison of different strategies, 
these game values can serve as an indication or quantitative mea­
surement of the comparison.
With the occurrence of the two-strategy dominance problem 
which reduces a game into a competition between two single superior 
strategies instead of the intended comparisons between different 
strategies, the intended plan of using solution method applied to 
two-person zero-sum game to solve all two-person non-zero-sura games 
in the model had to be abondoned. Some other means for solving 
games in the model must be sought.
Basic Reasoning of the New Algorithm
The problem to be dealt with in here now is to acquire game 
values which would give a better representation of what different 
strategies with their associated utility numbers indicate. These 
games values also should not be the result of a competition between 
two superior strategies, i.e., all strategies should participate in 
the derivation of the game values. Consequently, a new algorithm 
for solving games in the competitive evaluation model was developed.
The new algorithm is based on the concept of average ex­
pected value. In decision theory the question involved in the course 
of actions is always the choice of a proper decision from a number of 
alternatives which usually represent variety of circumstances. To 
help with the decision making, the statistical method of expectation 
or average value is very often used to give quantitative representa­
tion of each alternative. Average expected values are usually
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calculated from the linear combination of the products of different 
expected values and their corresponding probabilities. For example, 
if Xĵ 's, for i =1, 2, m, are a series of values expected to
happen and p(xĵ ) are the probabilities associated with each of these 
Xi's, then the average expected value is calculated by the following 
formula;
i=m
Average expected value E(X) = 1 p(xĵ )*Xi ,
i=l
where 0 1.p(xi) 1. The proposed new algorithm is based on this 
concept of average expected value. Payoff coefficients which are 
derived from utility numbers of strategies will be considered as 
the expected values and a number representing the occurrences of the 
strategies will take the place of the probabilities. The new algori­
thm has in some way a resemblance to Eq. (2.2) used to compute game 
solution for mixed strategies shown earlier in Chapter II.
The New Algorithm
The new algorithm can be stated as the following:
. i=m , j=n
V b  = p (q .îj hp




V a ' Q (p bij)
, j=n i=m
° ^  i h  i l
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where g = game value for player A when the opponent is player B,
Vs A = game value for player B when the opponent is player A,
â ĵ = payoff coefficients for player A,
= payoff coefficient for player B,
P = the number of rows which have at least one non-zero
entry of the CPM's,
Q = the number of columns which have at least one non­
zero entry of the CPM's.
This new algorithm for solving games in the competitive 
evaluation model is based on the concept of average expected values. 
The game value for a player is simply the sum of all his payoff coef­
ficients divided by the number of non-zero payoff coefficients.
Although this algorithm is quite different from the original­
ly intended method, i.e., to solve a two-person non-zero-sum game by 
using techniques usually applied to two-person zero-sum games, yet 
the original plan of obtaining one's game value by isolating another 
player's payoff coefficients is still being adopted. For example, 
none of player B's payoff coefficients bĵ j are used in the process 
to obtain game value  ̂for player A; in other words, only player 
A's payoff coefficients are used in calculating game value ^ for 
player A.
Several advantages of this new algorithm are stated in the 
following:
(i) All strategies participate in the final derivation of 
game values. This is what originally intended before this algorithm 
was developed. The development of this new algorithm v;as due to the
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occurrence of the two-strategy dominance problem in the payoff ma­
trix which has resolved a game into a competition between two su­
perior strategies and thus has discredited all the deleted strate­
gies. But the new algorithm of taking average expected values as 
game solutions does consider all strategies simultaneously.
(ii) The new algorithm allows players with different types 
of strategies or even unequally numbered strategies to launch a 
competition or a comparison. This may answer the question of the 
necessity of going through all these many steps to find the average 
expected values as a result of comparison instead of just comparing 
the identical strategies of the two players. Because in some cases 
when two players have different types of strategies or unequally 
numbered strategies, the one-to-one comparison is impossible. But 
the new algorithm permits comparisons to be made in both cases.
(iii) The new algorithm affords a quantitative measurement 
of a comparison, the game values, which, actually, can be consi­
dered as the summary of numerous comparisons between individual 
strategies. This can be deemed as the step of providing data in a 
more meaningful and simpler form to help decision-making.
Strategy Priority Weighting Factor
In the new algorithm used to obtain game values, all the 
entering payoff coefficients are considered to be equally weighted. 
This means that no matter how large or small a payoff coefficients 
is, it is always considered to be at the same level of importance as 
any other payoff coefficients. Since payoff coefficients are derived 
from utility numbers of strategies, the consideration of all payoff
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coefficients as equal entry would also indicate that all strategies 
are of the same importance. But in application, if each strategy 
represents a type of water resources development and certain types 
of development may more desperately be needed, then a weighting 
factor for bringing out this priority is necessary. Essentially 
this weighting factor allows a decision-maker familiar with a cer­
tain player's strategies to inject this judgement into the model 
by assigning relative importance to the player's strategy.
Since strategy priority weighting factor is developed on 
strategy basis, the utility number of a strategy will be multiplied 
by this factor before it can be used to procure payoff coefficients. 
This is done as follows:
U . ' = U .‘(p .ai ai ai
where weighted utility number for strategy of player A,
= ordinary utility number for strategy A^ of player A,
<|)̂  ̂= strategy priority weighting factor for strategy A^ of 
player A.
With the introducing of the strategy priority weighting 
factor, the derivation of payoff coefficients will be modified as 
follows :
(j) . * U  . U  *.
ai ai ai ̂ ^ ^ 0, U. . ̂  0, and <p,. ̂  0,
*bj'"bj %  ’ ai ’ bj ’ bj
if = 0, or Uyj = 0, or 4)̂  ̂= 0,
(3.3)
where a^j = payoff coefficient for player A,
Uai' ~ weighted utility number for player A's strategy A^,
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Uyj' = weighted utility number for player B's strategy Bj
= utility number for player A's strategy
Uyj = utility number for player B's strategy Bj,
= strategy priority weighting factor for player A's
and
strategy Aĵ ,
ÿyj = Strategy priority weighting factor for player B's strate­
gy Bj.
Each player of a game should have different priorities and, 
thus, different weighting factors, for different strategies. These 
factors should be derived objectively and under careful considera­
tion with all the factors for different players being interrelated 
and evaluated on the same criteria. This is necessary since game 
values obtained later from each game or set of games will all be 
considered simultaneously in the decision-making process.
In the case that objective priority weighting factors for 
each strategies can not be obtained and that the risk of using the 
subjective and biased weighting factors does not want to be taken, 
it is better to assume that all the strategies are in the same level 
of importance, i.e., to assume all the priority weighting factors 
being equal to one, instead of using biased factors and leading to 
biased solutions.
Analysis of Games
Although the methods used for obtaining payoff coefficients 
and game values of a game in the competitive evaluation model are 
quite simple and straightforward, yet several things concerning 
games must be pointed out now.
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First, while using the concept of two-person non-zero-sura 
games, it is necessary to identify the players of each game. Since 
evaluation of water resources development is the main objective of 
this model and comparison information obtained from game arranged 
between water resources basins are used to support evaluation, 
players are arranged into games if comparison information between 
them is needed. With a systematic arrangement, players can appear 
repeatedly in different games either with same opponent or with dif­
ferent opponents. If the same players are to appear in different 
games or different sets of games, the purpose of each game or set 
of games should be clearly defined. The grouping of players should 
also be done very carefully so that confusion will not occur later 
on when solutions are considered in the final decision making pro­
cess .
In the development of the payoff matrix, strategies of each 
player and the associated utility numbers are pursued first. Strate­
gies used by each player in a particular game should be in the re­
lated categories. It is not necessary that the two players of a 
game have the same number of strategies. Because it is always pos­
sible to make the two players have the same number of strategies 
by filling in strategies with zero utility number which in turn will 
produce payoff coefficients with zero value to be deleted during the 
calculation of game values.
The determination of utility numbers for a strategy is a 
very important step for a game. The magnitude of the utility number 
will influence the outcome of a game greatly. Any increase of
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utility number for a strategy will not only magnify the payoff co­
efficients for this player, it will also reduce the values of the 
payoff coefficients for the opponent. For example, if utility 
number U for player A's strategy A, is increased, then all player 
A's payoff coefficients a^j's, which are equal to U^^/Uyj, will 
also be increased, because all a^^'s are now derived from a large 
At the same time, all player B's payoff coefficients b^j's, 
which are equal to will be decreased, because U^j's are
now divided by a large to arrive at the values of b^j's. But 
it should be remembered that if one player tries to increase his 
game value by increasing the utility number associated with a par­
ticular strategy and thus the derived payoff coefficients, the 
other player can also do the same thing. Therefore, it is quite 
important to keep it in mind that the determination of utility 
numbers should be done carefully and objectively. Fortunately, 
after the competitive measuring or evaluation used in the process 
to obtain payoff coefficients, i.e., the dividing of an utility 
number of a player by the utility numbers of the other player's 
strategies to obtain payoff coefficients, the effect of a biased 
utility number on the overall game value is reduced.
Summary
(lames in the model are used to obtain comparison informa- 
t ion between players. In the present case, these players will be 
water resources i)a.sins in the United States. The structure of a 
game in the model is shown in Fig. 3.2. All games in the model are 
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of players. Players are initiated into a game whenever comparison 
information between them is needed and they have some common ground 
to be compared.
The basic payoff matrix of games in the model is essentially 
the same as the traditional two-person non-zero-sum games',i.e., the 
gain of one player does not indicate the equal loss of the other 
player and payoff coefficients need to be designated for both players. 
The only exception in the payoff matrix for games in the model is the 
addition of a new term, the utility number of a strategy (UNS).
Strategies are the basic tools for competition or comparison. 
It is intended to use various types of water resources development 
as strategies for the basin-players.
To quantify the effect of a strategy, or development, an 
utility number is introduced as the measure of the absolute payoff 
for a strategy. A strategy may have different utility numbers in 
different sets of games. Utility numbers are used to procure payoff 
coefficients of the matrix.
The process of procuring payoff coefficients emphasizes the 
concept of competitive evaluation. Because one player's utility 
number is measured, evaluated, or divided, by another player's util­
ity numbers of different strategies to derive the values of payoff 
coefficient. But this process also produced a new problem, the two- 
strategy dominance, which resolves a game into the competitive between 
two superior strategies, one for each player. Consequently, the tra­
ditional solution methods for solving games have to be abandoned due 
to the occurrence of this two-strategy dominance problem. And a new
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algorithm based on average expected values was developed.
The new algorithm is quite simple, but it supplies a method 
for obtaining game values with the participation of all strategies 
and a summary of data in a meaningful and simpler form to help de­
cision making. A strategy weighting factor was introduced to bring 
out the priority of a strategy, or a development in water resources. 
Game values of a game will later be compared with all other game 
values from the same set of games.
More Weighting Factors 
A strategy priority weighting factor which is used to bring 
out the priority for certain types of water resources development 
within a river basin was discussed earlier in this chapter. Two more 
weighting factors, the game or basin priority weighting factor and 
the objective priority weighting factor, will be introduced here.
Game or Basin Priority Weighting Factor 
The game priority weighting factor is actually used to bring 
out the priority for development of a water resources basin and 
therefore, may also be called the basin priority weighting factor. 
Since games are used to generate comparison information between 
basin-players, if a weighting factor is applied to the game values 
of a basin-player, it certainly will bring out the priority for de­
velopment of a basin. The game values for a basin-player will be 
multiplied by this weighting factor and it is defined as follows:
VÂ B = 8A'VA-B (S'*)
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where = weighted game value for player A when the opponent is
player B,
g = original game value for player A when the opponent is 
player B,
0^ = game or basin priority weighting factor for Basin- 
player A.
An experimental basin priority weighting factor for water 
resources basins in the United States was developed in this study 
and it will be discussed more lengthily in the next chapter. The 
development of this factor is based on the existing data regarding 
to the regional federal income taxes paid, population, and popula­
tion and per capital income.
Objective Priority Weighting Factor
This weighting factor is introduced to point out the relative 
importance of different evaluation criteria. Since the number of 
evaluation criteria used in this model is unrestricted and is decided 
by decision-maker, all the evaluation criteria introduced may not be 
of the same importance viewed by the decision-maker. In other words, 
some comparison information under certain evaluation criteria may be 
valued more than those under other evaluation criteria, then a 
weighting factor is necessary for bringing out their relative impor­
tance. This factor will be applied to all game values in the same 
set of games, i.e., under the same evaluation criterion, and it is 
defined as follows:
V^’ = X.'Vi (3.5)
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where ' = weighted game value from the set of games under the 
evaluation criterion i,
= original game value from the set of games under the 
evaluation criterion i,
= objective priority weighting factor for the evaluation 
criterion i.
Since the four evaluation criteria introduced in this study 
are purely for demonstration purpose, no effort was made to find 
their objective weighting factory and thus, these factors will all 
be assumed to be equal to one in this study.
Operation of the Model
The relationship between the components of the competitive 
evaluation model and their equivalent parts in game theory termino­
logy is shown in Fig. 3.3. Figure 5.4 shows the structure and the opera­
tion of the model. The terms used for the components of the model 
and their game theory originals may have been used interchangeably 
all throughout this study. No effort was made to distinguish when 
a term is restrictively a component of the model or just a game 
theoretic term in the model. However, Fig. 3.3 will help to illus­
trate the whole relationship.
The model is mainly a collection of sets of two-person non- 
zcro-sum games. Sets of games are used to represent evaluation 
criteria decided by the decision-maker. In other words, each set 
of games is headed by an individual evaluation criterion. All these 
evaluation criteria can be considered as equal entries of the model. 
Otherwise, if any of them, viewed by the decision-maker, is more
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important than the others, then the objective priority weighting 
factor for a set of games is introduced. This factor, if intro­
duced, is multiplied to all game values in a set of games.
Under each evaluation criterion there is a series of games 
used to obtain comparison information . Each individual game is 
arranged for two opponents representing water resources basins in 
the United States when comparison information between them is needed. 
The traditional game strategies are used to represent various types 
of water resources development. All types of water resources de­
velopment or strategies can be considered to be equally important; 
if not, the strategy priority weighting factors are used to show the 
preferences. These factors are multiplied to the newly introduced 
term, the utility number of a strategy, which measures the absolute 
payoff of a strategy. Utility number of a strategy is used to pro­
cure payoff coefficients by a competitive evaluation method which 
employs two utility numbers of two strategies belonging to the two 
opponents through a mutual measuring to obtain payoff coefficients.
A new algorithm of taking average expected value , developed in this 
study to replace the traditional game solution method due to the oc­
currence of the two-strategy dominance problem, is used to calculate 
game values or solutions for both players of a game to show the re­
sult of a comparison.
All game values derived within each set of games reflect the
comparisons between water resources basins under a certain evalua­
tion criterion. Some of the basins may have established more pri­
orities for development than the others, then, the game or basin
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priority weighting factors are used to bring out these priorities. 
These factors are multiplied to the game values in each set of 
games.
Solutions or game values representing all needed compari­
sons between basins from all sets of games are then compared and 
interpreted. And consequently, they will be used to draw recom­
mendations to be considered in the decision-making process.
Conclusion
The structure of the competitive evaluation model is very 
simple and flexible. The model is just an aggregation of games 
which are grouped in sets and are used to obtain comparison infor­
mation for the decision-maker. There is no limitation on the number 
of sets of games, the number of games in a set, or even the number 
of players in the model. Evaluation criteria represented by sets 
of games, game for generating comparisons, and players representing 
water resources basins can always be initiated into the model by 
the decision-maker whenever they are deemed necessary.
The mathematical techniques used in the model is quite 
straight forward. No complicated calculation is involved in the 
model. Even the traditional game solution methods which sometimes 
increase the complexity of a game are omitted in favor of a simple 
algorithm of taking average expected value as the solution for 
games.
The special feature of the model is the emphasis of the 
competitive evaluation or comparison all throughout the model. The 
routine of arranging players into games whenever comparison
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information between them is needed is an indication of this fea­
ture. In the process to obtain payoff coefficients, two utility 
numbers of two strategies belonging to the two opponents of a game 
are mutually measured and evaluated is another emphasis of this 
feature. Comparing solutions from games in each set of games and 
solutions from all sets of games is also an emphasis of this feature.
The development of the model presented in this chapter is 
in a very general format. This was specially planned so that this 
model, with some modification, can always be used in areas other 
than water resources. The emphasis in this chapter is the general 
development of the model. Due to the absence of some detail expla­
nation of how to implement this model, sometimes the model might 
seem to be quite abstract. This is specially true in the final 
steps of the model, the interpretation of the data obtained and the 
formulation of the recommendation, which can only be explained 
clearly and easily if data have been fed into the model and results 
of comparisons have been obtained. It is planned in the next 
chapter to emphasize the detail application of the model to the 
evaluation of water resources development planning, then the appli­
cation of the competitive evaluation model can be more clearly and 
easily explained.
CHAPTER IV
THE APPLICATION OP THE COMPETITIVE EVALUATION MODEL 
FOR WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
The approach of using the competitive evaluation model 
for water resources development planning will be illustrated in 
this chapter. The model was used to find the comparisons of water 
resources development planning between different water resources 
basins in the United States. Four evaluation criteria were intro­
duced to head the sets of games arranged between the water resources 
basins and the player representing the whole nation while various 
types of water resources development were employed as strategies by 
the players. Results of comparisons were interpreted and used as 
guidelines for forming recommendations for the decision-maker. The 
inputs of the model and the results will be discussed in the fol­
lowing.
Sets of Games - Evalaution Criteria
Sets of games in the model are headed by evaluation criteria. 
Four evaluation criteria were introduced in this study. They mea­
sure the long-term total objective, the short-term objective, the 
percent of needs met, and the percent of effectiveness. Based on 
the availability of data, these evaluation criteria were only intro­
duced for demonstration purposes and by no means do they represent 
a complete evaluation. If more data were available, other evaluation
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criteria could always be introduced. Each one of the evaluation 
criteria will be discussed separately in the following.
The Long-term Total Objective
The long-term total objectives are used to define the ex­
tent of long-range needs in a region. In other words, these ob­
jectives indicate the water resources development in a region when 
this region is fully developed under the present standard and they 
may be modified from time to time through comprehensive planning.
These objectives for each individual location are usually defined by 
people who know the region well. They may be the maximum possilbe 
development or any degrees of development ranging from no new de­
velopment to maximum development.
The ideal long-term total development objective usually 
should be defined under the assumption that no constraint is enforced. 
Of course, this assumption can only be applied when the objectives 
of physical development are being defined. It would be quite dif­
ficult to define some other direct or indirect development objectives 
under such an assumption. Because some development, for instance, 
the well-being objectives which will be described later, can be de­
veloped without bounds. The long-term total physical development 
objectives defined under the no-constraint assumption show how a 
region should have been developed when there is no capital or any 
other type of limitation existing. Although this no-constraint 
assumption is quite ideal, it is helpful to find the most ideal 
and the most favorable development needed in a region.
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Although other types of long-term total objectives were 
also considered, only the long-term total physical development ob­
jective was used in this study. In the "Procedure for Evaluation 
of Water Resources and Related Land Resources Projects" [4], 
several categories of national and regional development objective 
were listed. For example, the national income account objective 
measures the national income increases from employment, growth in 
productivity, economic stability; the regional income account ob­
jective measures the economic activities by national income accrual, 
and related economic activity; the environmental account objective 
measures specified objective such as preservation of natural areas, 
preservation of cultural areas, achieving quality standards, and 
protection and rehabilitation of resources; and the well-being ac­
count objective measures the specified objective such as security 
of life, security of health, national defense, inter-personal income 
distribution, and interregional income distribution. All these 
measurements of development objectives may be used as possible eval­
uation criterion for a single project, but with their unlimited 
horizon, it is difficult to use them in defining the total objective 
of a region at the present time. So far the only feasible measure­
ment of long-term total objectives in a region was the measurement 
of the physical development which was used in this study.
By using the long-term total objectives as an evaluation cri­
terion in the model, it is possible to determine the long-term plan­
ning of a region and how this region stands when it is compared to 
other regions or to the whole nation. Thus the decision-maker will
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know which regions need the most development, and priority may then 
be considered for them.
In order to make comparisons possible, the measurements of 
all long-term total development objectives defined in this study 
were converted into a unified monetary term. This was done because 
different types of water resources development are usually measured 
in different units. For example, flood control is measured in 
acres, whereas municipal and industrial water supply is measured in 
gallons/day and agriculture water supply is measured in acres. The 
conversion method used in this study was to convert the total ob­
jectives in all types of development, whether they were measured in 
acres, gallons, or any other units, into a monetary measurement.
This monetary measurement is a product of the output units and a 
mean value. The output units were those defined for the long-term 
total objective. The mean value calculated the benefit in dollar 
per unit of development output. Every benefit category in different 
regions had its own mean value. These two figures, the total output 
units in each type of development and the respective mean value of 
benefit estimated in dollars, were then multiplied together to give 
the dollar value of the total objective in each type of development 
in each region.
Data used to determine the long-term total objectives were 
collected from data obtained by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
The regional objectives defined by the Corps were assumed to be the 
long-term total objectives of a region and they were multiplied by 
their respective mean values of benefit in dollar value to convert
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to monetary terms. These data are shown in Appendix II. The validity 
of these data was not questioned since the only interest in using 
them was to verify the model developed. Data used in the following 
evaluation criteria were also from the same source.
The Short-term Objective
The evaluation of short-term planning is also important in 
a decision making process. The long-term total objectives, which 
show the development of a region when it is fully developed under 
the present standard, are usually just a gross estimation. The 
short-term objectives define what are needed for a region in a cer­
tain relatively short time limit. Since they are the immediate 
needs, short-term total objectives can be defined more directly and 
more precisely than the long-term total objectives.
In this study, a five year short-term objective was used.
Data of project output for the years from 1972-1976 defined by the 
Corps were assumed to be the short-term objective of a region.
In order to make comparison possible, short-term development 
objectives were also converted into monetary term. The output units 
of the five year (1972-1976) short-term objectives of various de­
velopment in different basins and their direct total benefit in 
dollar are shown in Appendix II. In a few cases, the short-term 
development objective may exceed the long-term total objective in 
output units because sometimes it was more economical to develop 
at one time more units than the amount estimated for long-term 
planning by the present standard.
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The Percent of Effectiveness Measurement 
Another new evaluation criterion introduced in this study
is used to measure the percent of effectiveness. Earlier, the long­
term total and short-term objectives were discussed. The measure­
ment of the percent of effectiveness is based on the measurements
of these two objectives and is defined as the following:
Unit outputs of the 
Short-term object-1V6
The percent ot effectiveness - untt oOt'FutT ofT he " ' W-')
long-term total ob- 
j ective
The long-term total and short-term objectives of develop­
ment in a region measure the direct needs of various types of de­
velopment. The percent of effectiveness measures the percentage 
of the immediate short-term needs of various types of physical de­
velopment in a region meeting the long-term total development ob­
jectives. The results of this measurement will supply information 
for decision making. For instance, if the goal of a decision is 
to have development established uniformly towards resources comple­
tion in various regions, then the regions which have the lower per­
cent of effectiveness should receive higher priorities for develop­
ment. If it is decided to have certain region completely developed 
before considerations are given to other regions, then priorities 
for development should be given to the regions with the highest 
measurement in the percent of effectiveness. In both cases, it is 
obvious that the measurement of the percent of effectiveness is very 
much dependent on the previously defined long-term and short-term 
objectives.
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The Percent of Needs Met Measurement
The percent of needs met measurement is similar to the mea­
surement of the percent of effectiveness. The latter takes into 
account the percentage of the short-term physical development objec­
tives meeting the long-term total objectives and all the measure­
ments are based on physical development output units. The percent 
of needs met measurement is based on the estimated benefit units, 
measured in monetary value, derived from various developments. It 
is defined as follows:
Dollar benefit of the
The percent o f needs .e t  = n o l l a r ^ S e f t r o ^ t t e  " 1°°» • (4-2)
long-term total ob­
jective
It might be questioned whether the percent of needs met and 
the percent of effectiveness were the same measurement with differ­
ent names. It seems that the only difference between these two 
measurements is that both the dollar benefit measurements of the 
short-term and long-term total objectives In the percent of needs met 
are just derived by multiplying the unit outputs of the short-term 
or the long-term total objectives by a mean value. Actually these 
two measurements are different. Firstly, the dollar benefit value 
of the long-term total objective is obtained by multiplying the ob­
jective by the corresponding regional mean value according to dif­
ferent developments. The dollar benefits of short-term objective 
are computed a little differently. Since benefits of short-term 
objective are expected in the near future, they are calculated
73
directly from the outputs and hence are more precise when compared 
to the estimation of the dollar benefits of the long-term total ob­
jective which are more or less a gross approximation. Secondly, 
the percent of effectiveness only measures the physical units of ac­
hievement, but sometimes objectives may involve the same units 
of physical development while the intensity of the use is changed 
and, thus, the change of the benefit value derived. Thirdly, it is 
also possible that the development units of the short-term objective 
may exceed the long-term total objective but the outcome of benefit 
does not reach what is required. In other words, the quantity, 
which is measured by the physical development units, has been ac­
hieved but not the quality, which is measured by the benfits derived. 
Therefore, the measurement of the percent of needs met which is 
based on the monetary measurement of the benefit derived is necessary 
and it offers a different dimension of evaluation approach from those 
indicated by the measurement of the percent of effectiveness.
Although the measurement bases of the percent of needs met 
and the percent of effectiveness are different, one in monetary out­
puts and one in physical outputs, the interpretations of the results 
of the two measurements are similar. For example, as it was illus­
trated for the measurement of the percent of effectiveness, if a 
decision is made to develop basins uniformly towards the goal of 
reaching the basins' total long-term total objectives in dollar value, 
then priorities for new development or for increasing the intensity of 
certain development should be given to regions with the lower figure 
in the percent of needs met measurement.
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Conclusion
The evaluation criteria introduced here are a little 
different from the traditional water resources development evalua­
tion methodology which usually use the benfit and cost ratio ana­
lysis. Although benefits in dollar still dominate the measurements 
used in these newly introduced criteria, they were used differently 
from the traditional benefit and cost ratio analysis. The costs of 
different categories of development were not mentioned in any of the 
evaluation criteria introduced so far. It was not because cost is 
not an important factor. It was due to the fact that complete data 
of some of the regions were not available at the time when the 
model was being tested. If cost data are available, it is always 
possible to include new evaluation criteria in order to obtain 
comparison information of various water resources development in 
different basins based on costs.
Several other evaluation criteria were also under consider­
ation earlier, for example, the mean value comparison of the bene­
fits of various types of development in different regions, the mea­
surement of dollar benefit per unit short-term development, the per­
cent of needs met per unit output measurement, the percent of ef­
fectiveness per unit output measurement, etc. It was due to the 
lack of available data or the lack of compatible measurement unit 
that the time consuming effort of data collecting had to be abandoned 
in favor of spending more time in developing the general model.
Therefore the evaluation criteria introduced so far were not 
the only possible ones but they were the ones which were used to
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illustrate the application of the model based on the availability 
of the existing data. Any time when data are available, other eval­
uation criteria or measurement can always easily be included in the 
model.
Players of Games - Water Resources 
Basins in the United States
In planning water resources use and development, Senate 
Document No. 97 (S.D. No. 97) states that all viewpoints - national, 
regional. State and local - shall be fully considered and taken into 
account in planning. Regional, State, and local objectives shall be 
considered and evaluated within a framework of national public ob­
jectives and available projections of future conditions and needs. 
Similarly, available projections of future conditions and needs of 
regions. States, and localities shall be considered in plan formula­
tion.
With the above policies in mind, when the competitive evalua­
tion model is used for the evaluation of water resources development 
planning, it is necessary to have players representing viewpoints of 
different level of interests.
S. D. No. 97 [ 2] also indicates that river basins are 
usually the most appropriate geographical units for planning the use 
and development of water and related land resources in a way that 
will realize fully the advantage of multiple use, reconcile compe­
titive uses through choice of the i)est combination of uses, coordi­
nate mutual responsibilities of different agencies and levels of
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government and other interests concerned with resource use. Plan­
ning use of water and related land resources, therefore, shall be 
undertaken by river basins, groups of closely related river basins, 
or other regions.
The United States Water Resources Council presently uses 
twenty geographic water regions or basins, which are shown in Table 
4.1 and Fig. 4.1, and one-hundred-ten subregions or sub-basins in 
planning. Seventeen of the twenty regions are in the contiguous 
United States. The other three are Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico.
Since this research was limited by the data collected, 
eighteen water resources regions were employed as players of games 
in verifying the competitive evaluation model. These eighteen re­
gions are shown in Table 4.2. They are almost identical with the 
regions defined by the United States Water Resources Council except 
that the region Tennessee was deleted and that the regions Upper 
Colorado and Lower Colorado were combined into the Colorado region. 
The nation was also used as a player representing the whole United 
States. These players will be called the basin-players or the 
nation-player.
At the present time, only players representing the basin- 
level were employed in the verification of the model. If more de­
tailed study concerning the development within a basin or region is 








































Figure 4.1. Water resource regions in the United States.
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Table 4.2. Players of games representing water resources 
regions in the competitive evaluation model.
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Appearance of Players
To make the selection of players in each set of games more 
systematic and the comparison information obtained sufficient, it 
was decided that all eighteen basin-players representing different 
water resources regions and the nation-player will all appear in 
each set of games. This meant that all players will be evaluated 
under every evaluation criterion.
Games were arranged for every basin-player and the nation- 
player in each set of games. This led to the comparison information 
between the nation and every region. The comparisons between regions 
were indirectly obtained from the comparisons between the nation and 
each region.
To obtain comparison information between basin-players di­
rectly from games arranged between them is also possible although 
it was not practiced in this study. One way to do this is to arrange 
two-person games between all basin-players. But the results are 
quite complicated. For example, if there are ten basin-players, the 
number of two-person games between all basin-players will be 45* and 
they will lead to 90 game values, two for every two-person non-zero- 
sum game. Thus the procedure to analyze the results will be quite 
complicated. Another way to obtain comparison information between 
basins directly is to set up a standard basin-player and, then, to 
seek game values between this standard basin-player and all other
*Considering combination between 10 objects taking two at a
time, there will be c P  = —  = 45 combinations.2 218!
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players. For example, if ten basin-players are being considered, 
one as the standard player, then there will be 9 games and 18 game 
values. The latter method is obviously simpler than the one men­
tioned earlier. This method of establishing a standard player was 
used in this study but with the nation-player as the standard player 
instead of a basin-player.
The selection of the standard-player should be done objective­
ly. The standard player could be an average basin. The word "aver­
age" is applied to whatever evaluation criterion is under considera­
tion. For instance, if the measurement of the long-term total ob­
jective is being considered, then the basin with medium long-term 
total objectives could be used as the standard player. Although it 
might not be easy to decide which basin would be the best one to be 
used as the standard basin, by a careful consideration of the ob­
jective of the special evaluation criterion, it will not be too dif­
ficult to find the one to serve as the standard player.
An earlier attempt in this research was to select the basin- 
player representing the Arkansas-White-Red region as the standard 
player. It was because there were more data available from this re­
gion. Later the nation-player was used as the standard player be­
cause information thus obtained can be more easily analyzed. Since 
the main purpose was to illustrate the use of the competitive eval­
uation model, the selection of the standard player would not be too 
important here.
if further study within a water resources region is pursued, 
the games between sub-regions or between a region and its sub-regions
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can also be arranged. Of course, the more players that are initiated 
into the model, the more information will be obtained. Therefore, it 
is important to decide first to what extent the research will be 
carried out, then the number of players and the number of their ap­
pearances can be determined.
Strategies - Different Types of Development 
Represented by Benefit Categories
Various types of water resources development were employed 
as strategies by the players in games formulated in this model.
These developments actually are categorized according to the bene­
fits derived from them.
Senate Document No. 97 (S.D. No. 97) [2] defines benefits 
as the increases or gains, net of associated or induced costs, in 
the value of goods and services which result from conditions with 
the projects, as compared with conditions without the project. 
Benefits include tangibles and intengibles and may be classed as pri­
mary and secondary. Due to the availability of data, only primary 
benefits will be considered in this research.
S. D. No. 97 [2] has defined the types of primary benefits 
and standards for their measurement. They are as follows:
(1) Domestic, municipal, and industrial water supply bene­
fits - improvements in quantity, dependability, quality, and physi­
cal convenience of water use. The amount water users should be 
willing to pay for such improvements in lieu of foregoing them af­
fords an appropriate measure of this value.
83
(ii) Irrigation benefits - The increase in the net income of 
agricultural protection resulting from an increase in the moisture 
content of the soil through the application of water or reduction in 
damages from drought.
(iii) Water quality control benefits - The net contribution 
to public health, safety, economy, and effectiveness in use and en­
joyment of water for all purposes which are subject to detriment or 
betterment by virtue of change in water quality. The net contribu­
tion may be evaluated in terms of avoidance of adverse effects which 
would accrue in the absence of water quality control, including such 
damage and restrictions as preclusion of economic activities, cor­
rosion of fixed and floating plant, loss or downgrading of recrea­
tional opportunities, increased municipal and industrial water treat­
ment costs, loss of industrial and agricultural production, impairment 
of health and welfare, damage to fish and wildlife, siltation, 
salinity intrusion, and degradation of the esthetics of enjoyment
of unpolluted surface waters, or, conversely, in terms of the ad­
vantageous effects of water quality control with respect to such 
items. In situations where no adequate means can be devised to 
evaluate directly the economic effects of water quality improvements, 
the cost of achieving the same results by the most likely alterna­
tives may be used as an approximation of value.
(iv) Navigation benefits - The value of the services pro­
vided after allowance for the cost of the associated resources re­
quired to make the service available.
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(v) Electric power benefits - The value of power to the 
users is measured by the amount that they should be willing to pay 
for such power.
(vi) Flood control and prevention benefits - Reduction in 
all forms of damage from inundation (including sedimentation) of pro­
perty, disruption of business and other activity, hazards to health 
and security, and loss of life, and increase in the net return from 
higher use of property made possible as a result of lowering the 
flood control hazard.
(vii) Land stabilization benefits - Benefits accruing to land­
owners and operators and the public resulting from the reduction in 
the loss of net income, or loss in value of land and improvements, 
through the prevention of loss or damage by all forms of soil eros­
ion including sheet erosion, gullying, flood plain scouring, stream- 
bank cutting, and shore or beach erosion, or, conversely in terms of 
advantageous effects of land stabilization.
(viii) Drainage benefits - The increase in the net income from 
agriculture lands or increase in land values resulting from higher 
yields or lower production costs through reduction in the moisture 
content of the soil, and the increase in the value of urban and in­
dustrial lands due to improvement in drainage conditions.
(xij Recreation benefits - The value as a result of the pro­
ject of net increase in the quantity and quality of boating, swim­
ming, camping, picnicking, winter sports, hiking, horseback riding, 
sightseeing, and similar outdoor activities.
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(x) Fish and wildlife benefits - The value as a result of 
the project of net increase in reacreational, resource preservation, 
and commercial aspects of fish and wildlife.
(xi) Other benefits - Any other benefit categories not included 
in the above categories.
Although the general description of the primary benefits de­
rived from water resources development is stated in S. D. No. 97
[2], the detailed explanation and measurement were absent from that 
document. The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers [19] has defined a more 
detailed list of benefit categories. It is shown in Appendix I.
All the benefit categories are listed with an explanation of the de­
finition and a code number. Most of the categories also list the 
measurement unit. This list of benefit categories can be considered 
as a detailed sub-division of what was defined in the S. D. No. 97. 
For example, the flood control benefit defined in the S. D. No. 97 
was sub-divided according to whether the flood damage reduction is 
in urban area or in rural area, and according to whether it is the 
existing development or the future development, etc. In verifying 
the competitive evaluation model, these benefit categories were 
used as strategies by the players in each game. Data were collected 
according to these benefit categories for each basin, and they are 
shown in Appendix II.
The Utility Number of A Strategy (UNS)
The utility number of a strategy (UNS) is used to measure 
the absolute payoff or outcome of a strategy under certain evaluation
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criterion. Since four evaluation criteria were introduced in this 
study, each strategy which represents a category of benefits ob­
tained from the water resources development will have four UNS's, 
each one being derived under a particular evaluation criterion. 
Basically, these UNS's were directly or indirectly derived from the 
development objectives. The development output units of the long­
term total objective and the five year (1972-1976) short-term ob­
jective, the long-term regional mean value of benefit per unit of 
development, and the total benefit values of the five year (1972- 
1976) short-term objective were collected from data obtained by the 
U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and are shown in Appendix II. These 
data were used to calculate the UNS's under all four evaluation cri­
teria.
The UNS's under each evaluation criterion are shown in Ap­
pendix III. The UNS's under the long-term total objective criterion 
are measured in monetary term. They are calculated by multiplying 
the development output units of the long-term total objective of a 
region according to benefit categories by their respective regional 
mean values of benefit in dollar per unit of development. The UNS's 
under the short-term development objective are also measured by mone­
tary value and they were the total benefit value of the five year 
(1972-1976) short-term objective shown in Appendix II.
The UNS's under the measurement of the percent of effective­
ness were obtained through Eq. (4.1) liy using data of the development 
output units of the long-term total objective and the five year
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(1972-1976) short-term objective shown in appendix II. The UNS's 
under the measurement of the percent of needs met were obtained 
through Eq. (4.2) by using data of the long-term total objective 
in monetary term and the five year (1972-1976) short-term objective 
in monetary term shown in Appendix III.
The strategy priority weighting factor which was introduced 
in the last chapter was not developed here for strategies em­
ployed by the players. Because information which would lead to as­
sign priorities to strategies was not collected. Thus, all strate­
gies were considered to be in the same level of importance. In 
other words, all these factors were assumed to be equal to one. 
Hence, the original UNS's were used, instead of the weighted UNS's 
which would have been obtained by multiplying the original UNS's by 
the priority weighting factors, when these UNS's were used to pro­
cure the coefficients of the payoff matrix (CPM's).
Game Payoff Matrix and Its Coefficients
The game matrix is used to show payoffs corresponding to 
different strategies. Under each evaluation criterion introduced 
in this study, a game was arranged between the nation-player and a 
basin-player. An example of the payoff matrix of these games is 
shown in Fig. 4.2. The main entries of the matrix are the coeffi­
cients of the payoff matrix (CPM's) corresponding to different 
strategies and their respective utility numbers of strategy (UNS's). 
Because all games were two-person non-zero-sum, each entry of the 
CPM's is comprised of two figures, one for each player.
B.c. = Benefit category code shown in Appendix I. UNS = Utility number of strategy.
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0.443,2.258) (3.333,0.300) (0.734,1.363) 
0.298,3.352) (2.246,0.445) (0.494,2.023) 
0.112,8.958) (0.842,1.188) (0.185,5.396) 
0.935,1.070) (7.055,0.142) (1.548,0.646)( 
0.709,1,411) (5.333,0.188) (1.174,0.852)( 
0.308,3.250) (2.316,0.432) (0.510,1.962) 
0.828,1.208) (6.228,0.161) (1.371,0.730)( 
0.047,21.450)(0.351,2.850) (0.077,12.950) 
0.508,1.968) (3.825,0.261) (0.842,1.188) 
0.238,4.206) (1.789,0.559) (0.394,2.539) 
0.273,3.667) (2.053,0.487) (0.452,2.214) 
0.142,7,033) (1.070,0.934) (0.236,4.246) 
0.084,11.917)(0.632,1.583) (0.139,7.194) 
0.266,3.763) (2.000,0.500) (0.440,2.272) 
0.184,5.430) (1.386,0.722) (0.305,3.278) 
0.126,7.944) (0.947,1.056) (0.208,4.796) 
0.270,3.698) (2.035,0.491) (0.448,2.233) 
0.277,3.605) (2.088,0.479) (0.459,2.176) 























(63 333 .0 016) (2 .209 ,0 .453) (38 000 .0 026)
(42 667 .0 023) (1 .488 .0 672) (25 600 .0 039)
(16 000 .0 063) (0 558 ,1 792) (9 600 ,0 104)
(133 667 .0 007) (4 .663 .0 214) (80 200 ,0 012)
(101 333 ,0 010) (3 535 .0 283) (60 800 ,0 016)
(44 000 .0 023) (1 .535 .0 652) (26 400 .0 038)
(118 333 .0 008) (4 128 .0 242) (71 000 .0 014)
(6 667 ,0 150) (0 233 ,4 300) (4 000 .0 250)
(72 667 ,0 014) (2 535 .0 594) (43 600 ,0 023)
(34 000 ,0 029) (1 186 ,0 843) (20 400 .0 049)
(39 000 ,0 026) (1 360 .0 735) (23 400 .0 043)
(20 333 ,0 049) (0 709 ,1 410) (12 200 ,0 082)
(12 000 ,0 083) (0 419 .2 389) (7. 200 .0 139)
(38. 000 ,0 026) (1 326 ,0 754) (22 800 ,0 044)
(26 333 ,0 038) (0 919 .1 089) (15 800 .0 063)
(18 000 ,0 056) (0 628 ,1 593) (10 800 ,0 093)
(38. 667 ,0. 026) (1 349 ,0. 741) (23. 200 .0 043)
(39. 667 .0 025) (1 384 ,0 723) (23. 800 ,0 042)
(55 667 .0 018) (1 942 ,0 515) (33. 400 .0 030)
(47. 333 ,0. 021) (1. 651 ,0. 606) (28. 400 ,0. 035)
00oo
Figure 4.2. G a m e  p a y o f f  m a t r i x .  P l a y e r  A  ( N a t i o n )  v s .  P l a y e r  B  ( A l a s k a  B a s i n )
E v a l u a t i o n  C r i t e r i o n :  P e r c e n t  o f  E f f e c t i v e  M e a s u r e m e n t ,
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The CPM's were derived from the UNS's by using Eq. (3.1). 
Although the competitive evaluation formulation used to calculate 
the CMP's is relatively straightforward as the number of strategies 
employed by the players increases, the process to obtain the CPM's 
becomes more tedious. For instance, if two players each have ten 
strategies, then there are two hundred CPM's to be computed, one 
hundred for each player. Most of the basin-players used in this 
study had at least several strategies in each game while the nation- 
player had even a greater number of strategies. Therefore, all the 
computations of the CPM's were done by computer. The CPM's of a 
game were later used to derive game values for each players of a 
game.
Game Solutions
Game solutions, or game values, are the indications of the 
comparisons between the players. Game values for each player were 
computed by using Eq. (3.2). This equation was based on the con­
cept of the average expected value. Just as with the computation of 
the CPM's, game values were computed by computer in this study.
Basin game values of all games under each evaluation criteria are 
shown in Table 4.3. These game values were from the sets of games 
headed by the four evaluation criteria: the long-term total objective, 
the five years (1972-1976) short-term objective, the measurement of 
the percent of effectiveness, and the measurement of the percent of 
needs met. The basin code numbers used in the table were shown 
earlier in Table 4.2. Only basin game values from each game are
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Table 4.3. Original basin game values from the sets of games headed 


















1 1.201 0.518 1.472 2.042
2 1.426 1.215 4.543 2.326
3 3.234 0.534 2.321 1.601
4 2.132 0.204 0.775 0.516
5 2.032 1.819 1.644 1.383
6 0.363 0.156 1.356 0.833
7 1.414 0.400 2.369 2.926
8 0.345 0.190 5.161 5.432
9 0.881 0.429 3.021 2.069
10 0.909 0.976 4.610 3.296
11 3.468 2.580 2.406 3.096
12 5.075 4.203 1.760 2.175
13 0.166 0.248 4.372 3.893
14 0.152 0.057 2.977 1.279
13 0.057 0.143 3.046 2.432
K) 2.603 1 .368 4.787 3.029
17 1.739 0.952 3.035 3.691
18 1.980 1.681 2.901 5.041
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shown in the table. Because in the present case, the only inter­
est was in seeking the comparisons between basins and, hence, the 
game values for the nation-player were disregarded.
These game values were the ones obtained directly from the 
coefficients of the payoff matrix (CPM's) before any weighting 
factors were applied to them. A basin, or game, priority weighting 
factor was developed in this study. This weighting factor will be 
applied to the original game value before the game value can be 
used as a basis to formulate recommendations for the decision-maker.
Basin Priority Weighting Factor
An experimental basin priority weighting factor was de­
veloped in this study. This factor was based on several criteria 
developed and used by the II. S. Army Corps of Engineers in formu­
lating water resources programs. [20] These criteria are listed be­
low.
Federal income taxes paid. Regions paying the greatest 
amount in federal income taxes receive the greatest amount of prior­
ity.
Population. Regions having the greatest number of people 
receive the greatest amount of priority.
Population and per capita income. For two regions having 
the same population, the one having the lower per capita income re­
ceives the greater amount of priority. Table 4.4 shows the priority 
allocated to different basins in percent based on these criteria.
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1 Alaska * * *
2 Arkansas-
White-Red 5 4 4
3 California 10 11 10
4 Colorado 1 1 2
5 Columbia- 
North Pacific 3 3 3
6 Great Basin * 1 1
7 Great Lakes 18 10 10
8 Hawaii * * *
9 Lower Mississippi 1 3 4
10 Missouri 4 4 4
11 North Atlantic 34 23 21
12 Ohio 8 10 10
13 Puerto Rico * 1 2
14 Rio Grande 1 1 1
15 S our i s-Red-Rainy * * *
16 South Atlantic 
Gulf 6 11 12
17 Texas-Gulf 3 5 5
18 Upper Mississippi 7 10 9
The Nation 100% 100% 100%
*0.5 percent or less.
**By U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
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To derive the basin priority weighting factors, all three 
criteria mentioned here were considered to be equally important.
The sum of percentages from each criterion for each basin was cal­
culated. The basin priority weighting factors were then obtained
from the sums. These factors were defined to be numbers ranging 
between one and two. A region shows no priority based on these 
criteria will have a weighting factor one; and the basin has the 
most priority will have a weighting factor two. The following 
equation can be used to calculate this factor:
Basin Priority Weighting Factor _ ■> . £i_ ca
for basin i  ̂ C ’
where C is a constant greater than the largest sum of percentages 
for each basin; is the sum of percentage for basin i.
In this study since all sums of percentages were less than 
one-hundred, the constant C was assumed to be equal to one-hundred. 
The values of 8 varies linearly and directly with respect to the 
sums of percentages. The derived priority weighting factor for all 
eighteen basins and their sums of percentages from the three criteria 
are shown in Table 4.5.
The derived basin priority weighting factors were then ap- 
plicd to the original game values by following Eq. (3.4), according 
to basins. The weighted basin game values from the sets of games 
headed by all four evaluation criteria are shown in Table 4.6.
Game Values and Recommendations 
Game values from the sets of games headed by the four
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Table 4.6. Weighted basin game values from the sets of games headed 


















1 1.201 0.518 1.472 2.042
2 1.583 1.349 5.043 2.583
3 4.237 0.700 3.041 2.097
4 2.217 0.212 0.806 0.537
5 2.215 1.983 1.792 1.507
6 0.370 0.159 1.383 0.850
7 1.951 0.552 3.269 4.038
8 0.350 0.190 5.161 5.432
9 0.951 0.460 3.263 2.235
10 1.018 1.093 5.163 3.691
11 6.173 4.592 4.283 5.508
12 6.496 5.380 2.253 2.784
13 0.169 0.253 4.459 3.971
14 0.157 0.059 3.066 1.317
15 0.057 0.143 3.046 2.432
16 3.358 1.765 6.175 3.907
17 1.965 1.075 3.430 4.171
18 2.495 2.118 3.655 6.352
96
evaluation criteria were used as bases for drawing recommendations 
for the decision-maker. Since the main objective was to find the 
comparisons of water resources development planning between water 
resources basins, only the basin game values will be considered in 
here. The nation-player only served as an intermediary for ob­
taining indirect comparison information between basins, its game 
values were disregarded in the present case. If games were arranged 
between basins and direct comparison information between basins was 
being sought, then both player's game values should be examined. 
Since the four evaluation criteria used here were only for illustra­
tion purposes, no attempt was made to normalize game values from 
different sets of games into a unified scale. All game values will 
retain their original values except being adjusted by the basin pri­
ority weighting factor, and they will be analyzed separately for 
each set of games.
In all games used in this study, the basin-players were 
competing with the same player, the nation-player, this made all 
the basin game values within each set of games comparable. The 
weighted game values from different set of games given in Table 4.6 
are also shown as graphs in Fig. 4.3 through Fig. 4.6.
Game Values Under the Long-Term 
Total Objective Criterion
Figure 4.3 shows the weighted basin game values for the set 
of games headed by the long-term total objective evaluation criter­
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BASIN CODE NUMBER
12 13 14. 15 16 17 18
Basin game values (weighted) from the set of games headed by the long-term total ob­
jective evaluation criterion.
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water resources development in a basin. Game values from the compe­
titive evaluation model under this evaluation criterion indicated 
the competitively measured averages of the long-term development 
needs of different benefit categories in a basin. These averages 
were obtained by the two main processes used in this model, the 
competitive measuring of the UNS's to obtain the CPM's and the game 
value computation of taking average expected value . In the compe­
titive measuring process, the national totals by benefit categories 
were used as measurement standard. From the computation algorithm, 
the average of the long-term development needs of all benefit cate­
gories were derived. The game values were generally not the indica­
tions of the sums of all the long-term development needs. Those 
sums can be more easily and directly calculated by adding all the 
monetary values of different developments in a basin.
A large game value under this evaluation criterion means 
that a larger number of the benefit categories needs are still in 
the position of needing great development. For example, basin No.
12 shown in Fig. 4.3 had the largest game value, 6.496. An obser­
vation of this basin's UNS's of the long-term total objective in 
monetary term indicated that the UNS's under all eight benefit 
categories were quite large. Hence it was natural to expect a large 
average, indicated by a large game value, of the long-term develop­
ment needs of different benefit categories for the basin. The basin 
with the next largest game value, 6.173, shown in Fig. 4.3 was 
basin No. 11 which had most of its thirteen benefit categories pos­
sessing large UNS's under the long-term total objective. Basin No.
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11 had the largest sum of long-term development needs in monetary 
value, $790,593,000; whereas those of the Basin No. 12 was the second 
largest, $695,894,000. These two rankings were just reversed in 
the game value ranking. Hence it is not true that the basin with 
the largest sum of long-term development needs in monetary value 
would also have the largest game value.
A small game value means that the various types of benefit 
categories do not have large long-term development needs. For in­
stance, the basin with the smallest game value, 0.057, shown in Fig. 
4.3 was basin No. 15 and its UNS's of long-term total objective were 
also quite small for all six benefit categories when compared to 
those belonging to basins No. 12 and No. 11. Incidently, basin No.
15 also had the smallest sum of long-term development needs, 
$6,447,000, among all basins.
Sometimes, it is also possible that a basin has a large game 
value while the majority of the benefit categories need little de­
velopment and only a few of the benefit categories with extremely 
large UNS's under the long-term total objective showing the needs 
for greater development. In this case, it is said that the strong 
needs for development of these few benefit categories have over­
shadowed the minor needs of the other benefit categories. For ex­
ample, considering basin No. 3 with the number three ranking in 
game values, 4.237, shown in Fig. 4.3, most of its UNS's under the 
long-term objective were not too large, but few benefit categories 
with extremely large UNS's had contributed to the large game value 
for this basin.
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In summary, if a decision were made to develop basins in 
such a way that basins having higher percentages of benefit cate­
gories which need more intensive development should receive spec­
ial consideration, then the basins with large game values should 
be especially considered. In the present case, it was basin No.
12 with the highest priority, followed by basin No. 11, then basin 
No. 3, etc.
Game Values Under the Five Year 
(1972-1976) Short-term Objective Criterion
The weighted basin game values from the sets of games headed 
by the five year (1972-1976) short-term objective evaluation cri­
terion are shown in Fig. 4.4. The interpretations of game values 
under the short-term objective and the long-term objective criteria 
are similar except that one is for short-term planning and one is 
for long-term planning. Game values under the five year (1972-1976) 
short-term objective evaluation criterion indicate the competitively 
measured averages of short-term development needs of all benefit 
categories in a basin.
If a decision were made to fulfill the development needs for 
basins in such a way that basins having higher percentage of benefit 
categories which need more intensive development in the five years 
(1972-1976) period should receive priorities, then the basins with 
the large game values should be especially considered. From Fig. 
4.4, it is obvious that basin No. 12 had the largest game value, 
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Figure 4.4. Basin game values (weighted) from the set of games headed by the five year (1972-1976) 
short-term objective evaluation criterion.
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having the smallest game value. This ranking of game value was not 
identical with those under the long-term objective. This is an in­
dication that the needs for long-term and short-term development 
were different in each basin although it was not unusual for some 
basins, like basin No. 12, to have greater needs for development 
both in long-term and short-term objectives than other basins.
Game Values Under the Percent of 
Effectiveness Criterion
The weighted basin game values from the set of games headed 
by the percent of effectiveness evaluation criterion are shown in 
Fig. 4.5. The percentage of short-term development needs in physi­
cal output units meeting the long-term total development ob­
jective is measured by the percent of effectiveness criterion. It 
should be mentioned again that the measurement here is a relative 
measurement, a relationship between the short-term and the long-term 
objectives. It is not the absolute measurement like the long-term 
or short-term objective. Game values under this evaluation criterion 
indicate the average of these percentages of different benefit cate­
gories in a basin. A small game value for a basin means that there 
is a large number of benefit categories which needs, further develop­
ment in order to reach the defined long-term total objective in a 
basin. A large game value would indicate that most of the benefit 
categories in a basin having their developments close to the long­
term needs. Therefore, if a decision is made to develop basins uni­
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Basin game values (weighted) from the set of games headed by the percent of effective­
ness evaluation criterion.
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game values should be considered specially. Otherwise, if it was 
decided to develop certain basins completely first, then basins with 
large game values are the ones to be given development priorities.
The ranking of game values shown in Fig. 4.5 was quite dif­
ferent from those shown earlier for the long-term or the short-term 
objectives. It is obvious that basin No. 16, with game value, 6.175, 
was the basin which, in an average among different benefit categories, 
had its short-term development needs closer to the long-term objective 
than other basins shown in Fig. 4.5. Basin No. 4, with game value
0.806, was the basin which still needs great development to reach 
the long-term objective.
Game Values Under the Percent of Needs Met Criterion
The percent of needs met evaluation criterion measures the 
percentage of the dollar benefit of short-term objective meeting 
the dollar benefit of long-term objective. The game values under 
this criterion indicate the averages of these percentages of differ­
ent benefit categories in a basin. The percent of needs met criter­
ion is similar to the percent of effectiveness criterion, except that 
the measurement bases are different, one in monetary value and the 
other in physical output units. However, the interpretations of 
game values under these two evaluation criteria are quite similar.
A small game value for a basin under the percent of needs met criter­
ion means that there is a large number of benefit categories which 
needs new development or needs to increase the development intensity 
in order to reach the defined long-term total objective measured by
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derived benefits in dollar value. A large game value would indi­
cate that most of the benefit categories in a basin having their 
development closer to the long-term needs expressed in dollar 
value, when it is compared to the basin with a small game value.
The weighted basin game values from the set of games 
headed by the percent of needs met evaluation criterion are shown 
in Fig. 4.6. The pattern of game value ranking in this figure was 
quite similar to those shown earlier under the percent of effective­
ness criterion for some of the basins. For example, basin No. 4, 
which had a small game value, 0.805, under the previous criterion, 
also had a small game value under this criterion. This meant that, 
measuring by an average among all benefit categories, basin No. 4's 
needs of short-term development objective, both in the number of out­
put units and in the dollar benefit values of these development, 
were far from the long-term total objective defined for this basin 
when they were compared with other basins. Therefore, if it was de­
cided to have all the basins progressing toward the long-term total 
development objective uniformly, then basin No. 4 should be given 
special attention for development.
For some other basins, the rankings of their game values 
under the two evaluation criteria were quite different. For instance, 
basin No. 16, which had a large game value, 6.175, under the percent 
of effectiveness criterion, had a moderate game value, 3,907, under 
the percent of needs met criterion. This indicated that the short­
term development needs of basin No. 16, in an average among all benefit 
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Figure 4.6. Basin game values (weighted) from the set of games headed by the percent of needs met 
evaluation criterion.
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of output units, but the intensity for use measured in dollar bene­
fit value still needs more improvement when this basin was compared 
with other basins. Hence, it is a matter for the decision-maker to 
decide whether the objective of getting more unit outputs of develop­
ment close to the long-term objective or the objective of reaching 
the use of intensity required by the long-term planning is to be 
favored, then priority can be assigned for basin development.
Game Values from All Sets of Games
After analyzing game values separately for each set of games 
headed by an evaluation criterion, game values from all sets of 
games were supposed to be compared and analyzed together so that de­
cision could be made basing on this final analysis. As it was stated 
earlier that the four evaluation criteria introduced here were 
just for illustration purposes, no effort was made to normalize game 
values from all sets of games to a unified scale so that rigorous 
comparisons and analysis of the game values could be done while all 
criteria were considered simultaneously.
Since all games were arranged between the nation-player and 
different basin-players, in the competitive measuring process, used 
to obtain the coefficients of the payoff matrix (CPM's) which were 
later used to calculate the game values, the national total had served 
as measuring standard . This practice had made game values from all 
sets of games in a relatively similar scale. The weighted basin 
game values from all four evaluation criteria are shown in Fig. 4.7. 
This figure would give a vague comparison of all the game values.
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Figure 4.7. Basin game values (weighted) from all four evaluation criteria.
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Since there could be many combinations of objectives based on the 
four evaluation criteria which had been used earlier to analyze game 
values from each set of games, it was not attempted to analyze any 
basin's game values under all evaluation criteria simultaneously. 
Because of this, the objective priority weighting factor, which was 
originally designed to bring out the relative importance of different 
criteria, was not developed here. Finally, any analysis of game 
values would have to be referred back to the previous discussion of 
game values under different evaluation criteria.
Sensitivity Analysis
Some sensitivity analyses of the results of games were done 
here. First, it was the comparison of the original and the 
weighted basin game values which are shown in Fig. 4.8. As it can 
be seen in the figure, most of the basins had their game values 
staying in a similar ranking for the original and the weighted game 
values. A few basins had their original game value rankings raised 
after the basin priority weighting factors had been applied to them. 
For example, under the percent of effectiveness evaluation criterion, 
basin No. 11 which had its game value, 2.406, exceeded by ten basins 
with game values ranging from 2.901 to 5.161; but the weighted game 
value of basin No. 11, 4.283, which was exceeded by the game values 
of only five basins ranging from 4.459 to 6.175, had a big jump in 
game value ranking. This means that the influence of the basin pri­
ority weighting factor sometimes was quite large for some basins. 
Hence, it further emphasizes that the development of the weighting
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Figure 4.8. The original and the weighted basin game values from all four evaluation criteria.
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factors should be done objectively and carefully.
As far as the number of strategies employed by each basin- 
player was concerned, it hardly had any effect on the game values.
A simple proof of this was that for a basin which had used the same 
number of strategies in games under all evaluation criteria, its 
game values rankings in each set of games fluctuated under different 
evaluation criteria.
The number of strategies with large or small utility numbers 
(UNS's) would affect the game values. After all, the UNS's were 
used to procure the CPM's which in turn were used to calculate the 
game values, an average among different strategies. Hence if more 
strategies with large UNS's were employed by a basin-player, the 
game value would be larger for this basin. As was mentioned in the 
previous chapter, if a basin was trying to raise the magnitude of its 
game values by adding more benefit categories with large UNS's into 
a game, other basin could also do the same thing. But this would 
destroy the whole purpose of an objective evaluation of planning.
On the other hand, large game values can also be obtained by eli­
minating benefit categories with small UNS's, but then, these eli­
minated benefit categories would not be included in the whole de­
velopment plan and they would also be eliminated from any considera­
tion for further development. Again it indicates that to increase 
the magnitude of a game value by manipulating the inclusion or the 
omission of benefit categories with large or small UNS's would not 
result in objective evaluation.
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The limited sensitivity analyses done here were just for 
demonstration purposes. In an actual evaluation process, more de­
tailed and rigorous sensitivity analyses should be done.
Summary
The model developed earlier was applied to the evaluation 
of water resources development planning in this chapter. The model 
was used here to find the comparison information of water resources 
development planning between different water resources basins in the 
United States, so that recommendations for development can be ob­
tained. For illustration purposes, four evaluation criteria which 
measure the long-term total objective, the five year (1972-1976) 
short-term objective, the percent of effectiveness, and the percent 
of needs met, were introduced to head the sets of game in this model. 
Eighteen water resources basins in the Untied States were designated 
as basin-players of the model so that comparison information of 
water resources development planning between these basins could be 
obtained. The nation as a whole was also introduced as a player, the 
nation-player, to serve as an intermediary for obtaining indirect 
comparisons between these basins. A game was arranged for each basin- 
player and the nation-player in each set of games headed by an eval­
uation criterion. Strategies employed by each player were various 
types of water resources development represented by benefit categories. 
The benefit categories, which can be considered as a detailed sub­
division of the primary benefit categories stated in S. D. No. 97, 
used in this research were defined by the U. S. Army Corps of
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Engineers. The data used here to calculate the utility numbers of 
strategies (UNS's) were collected from data obtained by the U. S.
Army Corps of Engineers. The UNS's were calculated for each 
player's strategies under every evaluation criterion. No strategy 
priority weighting factor was developed in this study. The UNS's 
were used to procure the coefficients of the payoff matrix (CPM's) 
and the computation was done by computer. The game solutions, or 
values, were obtained from the CPM's by using the algorithm of taking 
the average expected value and the computation was also done by com­
puter. An experimental basin priority weighting factor was developed 
based on three guidelines, the federal income taxes paid, population, 
and population and per capita income. This weighting factor was ap­
plied to the original game values. The weighted basin game value 
were finally analyzed under each evaluation criterion. And recom­
mendations, based on the game values, for developing basins were dis­
cussed. No attempt was made to analyze any game value when all four 
evaluation criteria were considered simultaneously, and, hence, no 
objective priority weighting fact was developed. Finally, an illus­
tration of a simple sensitivity analysis was done. To better illus­
trate the application of the competitive evaluation model, the veri­
fication of the model done in this chapter was summarized in Fig.
4.8 as a sample application of the model for water resources develop­
ment planning.
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Purpose: to obtain comparison in­
formation of water resources de­
velopment planninij between dif- 
fei'cnt water resources basins in 
the United States.
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Appearances of players: each basin- 
player appearing once in each set 
of games and the nation-player ap­
pearing in all games_____________
Strategies: different types of water 
resources development represented 
by benefit categories_____________
Utility number of strategy (UNS): one 
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Figure 4.9. Sample application of the competitive evaluation model 
for water resources development.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A new approach for the evaluation of water resources de­
velopment planning has been presented through the model developed 
in this study. This new approach was contemplated for solving 
some of the problems existing in the present practices of water re­
sources development planning. Two of the problems were the consi­
dering of individual development as an isolated entity and the 
using of the benefit and cost ratio as the only analysis in the 
evaluation process. The development of the model originated from 
game theory concepts. The principal tactics employed in the model 
are the competitive measuring and evaluation. As it was stated 
earlier, the main objective of this model is to establish a more ef­
fective evaluation methodology for assisting water resources de­
velopment planning. A set of the sub-objectives of the model was 
also defined earlier. How these sub-objectives have been accomplished 
in this model will be discussed briefly.
Review of the Sub-objectives of the Model
Several special situations in water resources development 
were presumed to be identified in this model. First, it is the 
overall system of water resources development as well as any indivi­
dual or local development. Since games used to obtain comparison in­
formation in the model can be arranged for any two parties from whom
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comparison information is needed, games arranged between the player 
representing the whole system and the players representing indivi­
dual developments would certainly supply information of the whole 
system and its components. In the verification of the model, the 
nation-player representing the whole nation was introduced to serve 
as the standard player for obtaining indirect comparisons between 
the basin-players and,thus, all the UNS's of a basin-player were 
competitively measured by the UNS's of the nation-player in games; 
this showed that the national situation was considered to be the 
overall system while the developments in individual basins were 
considered to be local development. Although micro-analysis of the 
development in an individual basin was not done in the verification 
of the model, it can be done by using this model if it is needed. 
For example, if the comparison of different types of development in 
an individual basin is needed, games can be arranged between the 
players representing different types of development in a region 
with different evaluation criteria being designated as strategies, 
and game values obtained can then be used to indicate the compari­
sons between different types of development. Actually, the model 
is capable of handling comparisons at any level of detail available 
or desirable.
Secondly, the relationship of water resources development 
in different locations or regions can be identified in this model. 
As a matter of fact, this sub-objective was especially emphasized 
in the development of the model. Games in the model are arranged 
for obtaining comparison information of water resources development
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in different basins; this is a strong indication that this relation­
ship has been identified. This sub-objective really shows that 
water resources development planning in a basin is not considered in 
isolation but it is compared with developments in other basins. In 
the verification of the model, comparison information between differ­
ent basins was obtained indirectly from games between the nation- 
player and basin-players; i.e., the nation-player was assumed to be 
the norm and a comparison between any individual and the norm also 
provide a inter-subsystem comparison. This was done because when the 
nation-player was introduced as the standard player, game values ob­
tained can be more easily analyzed. Even though comparisons were 
only made at the basin level in the verification of the model, if 
further comparisons between sub-regions in a basin are needed, the 
model can also be used to derive them.
Thirdly, the inter-relationship between different purposes 
or goals of water resources development is identified in the model.
In the verification of the model, strategies employed by the player 
of game were used to represent different purposes or different bene­
fit categories of development. The algorithm developed to calculate 
game value anticipates the participation of all strategies; this is 
an indication that different purposes of development are inter-re­
lated by contributing to tiie magnitude of the game value. As stated 
earlier, comparisons between different purposes of development can 
also be obtained through this model although it was not illustrated 
in the verification of the model.
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One more situation to be identified in the model is the pri­
ority among different purposes and locations of water resources de­
velopment. Weighting factors were introduced to bring out these 
priorities. The strategies priority weighting factor was designed 
for bringing out the relative importance of different types of water 
resources development in a basin although in the verification of the 
model this weighting factor was not developed for any strategy em­
ployed by the basin-player and the factor was assumed to be equal to 
one, i.e., all types of development were considered to be in the 
same level of importance in a basin when comparisons were made be­
tween basins. The development priority for different locations was 
indicated by the basin priority weighting factor. In the verifica­
tion of the model, an experimental basin priority weighting factor 
was developed based on three guidelines - federal income taxes paid, 
population, and population and per capital income of the region.
Game values for a basin were multiplied by the respective basin pri­
ority weighting factors before the game values were analyzed; and 
hence the development priority for different locations was identi­
fied .
Another sub-objective of the model is that the model should 
be able to recognize the competitive nature of water resources de­
velopment. No doubt that this sub-objective has been achieved in 
the model. The entire model was developed based on the competitive 
concept of game theory. As it was mentioned in the conclusion of 
Chapter III, the special feature of the model is the emphasis of the 
competitive evaluation or comparison throughout the model. The
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arrangement of games to obtain comparison information between water 
resources basins, the competitive measuring or evaluation process 
used to derive the CPM's, and the comparing of solutions from games 
in each set of games, all are indications that the model is able to 
recognize the competitive nature of water resources development.
In addition to the measurements of benefits and costs used 
in the present evaluation process, another sub-objective of the 
model was to argument new measurements. As a result of this, four 
evaluation criteria were introduced for illustration purposes, these 
new criteria measure the long-term total objective, the short-term 
objective, the percent of needs met, and the percent of effective­
ness. Although some other measurements were also considered, they 
were not used in the verification of the model. Further research 
may enable more measurements to be introduced.
The model has another sub-objective that is to provide sys­
tematic and specific recommendations for the decision-maker in 
order to benefit water resources development planning. This sub­
objective can be considered as an emphasis of the main objective 
of the model. Actually the whole model is a process to achieve this 
sub-objective. In the model, data of different types of water re­
sources development in various basins are collected. Game values 
are then obtained from games arranged through these data. These 
game values are then formulated. Basically this whole process was 
intended to summarize a large quantity of data and rearrange it in­
to a simpler and more meaningful form to provide systematic and 
specific recommendations for the decision-maker.
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The last sub-objective of the model is that the model de­
veloped should be simple enough to be practically applicable. This 
sub-objective is unquestionably accomplished. First, although the 
model was developed by using game theory concepts, the competitive 
measuring process used to procure the CPM's and the algorithm used 
to calculate game values are all quite straightforward. Secondly, 
the structure of the model is also very simple and flexible; it is 
simply a collection of sets of games. Therefore, there are no com­
plicated techniques involved in implementing the model.
The sub-objectives of the model defined earlier have basi­
cally been accomplished. The model also has some other advantages 
which are either originally intended or obtained as a by-product 
from the development of the model and they will be discussed next.
General Advantages of the Model
First of all, the structure of the model is quite flexible 
and is formulated in a modular fashion, so that new modules may be 
added or existing ones replaced or modified at minimal expense.
For instance, any number of evaluation criteria can be introduced 
if it is deemed necessary. The number of games in each set of games 
is unrestricted as well as the number of the players or the appear­
ances of each player. Also no restriction is enforced on what the 
player should represent or what kind of strategies should be em­
ployed. All these are arranged and decided by whoever is using the 
model.
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The model is not an optimization formulation which would 
indicate how exactly water resources development should be planned.
On the other hand, the results of games from the model is a summary 
of a large quantity of data presented in a simple and meaningful 
form which can be used to formulate recommendations for the decision­
maker. A budget allocation model developed earlier by Reid,
Lawrence, and Law [ 3 ] is the type of model which would show the 
decision-maker the optimal solutions for planning water resources 
development; a summary of that model is included in Appendix IV for 
reference. Anyhow, very often in the decision making process, it 
is better to consider evaluation results as recommendations other 
than direct and optimized answers. Because in the case that some 
optimized solutions are not satisfied by the decision-maker, there 
exists the tendency that the whole set of the optimized solutions 
might be totally disregarded. Results from the competitive evalua­
tion model do not give straightforward answers for the decision­
maker but they do offer some analytical outcomes to be used to 
formulate recommendations or guidelines for the decision-maker.
As stated in the development of the computation algorithm, 
the new model allows players with different types of strategies or 
even unequally numbered strategies to launch a comparison. Hence, 
in some cases when comparison is needed for two parties with differ­
ent types or unequally numbered aspects (though these aspects must 
belong to the same general categories) and the one-to-one compari­
son is impossible, the model still permits comparison to be made.
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If comparison between non-quantifiable benefits or other 
objectives is needed, the model is also capable of handling it.
In the development of the model, the coefficients of the payoff 
matrix were derived in such a way that all of them will be in unit- 
less measurements and, thus, they will lead to unitless game values 
so that game values from different games can be compared. There­
fore, if utility numbers can be assigned to the non-quantifiable ob­
jectives, then the non-quantifiable objectives of two different 
players can be compared through a game arranged between them. And 
the game values thus obtained can also be compared with other unit- 
less game values from the comparisons between the quantifiable ob­
jectives. Of course, this can only be done after a methodology for 
assigning utility numbers to the non-quantifiable objectives has been 
developed.
As a matter of fact, being able to introduce more measure­
ments and objectives, whether quantifiable or non-quantifiable, be­
sides the economic factors based on cost and benefit, is the main 
advantage of the evaluation method used in this model, as compared 
with the benefit and cost ratio analysis which is traditionally 
used in water resources development evaluation.
Limitations of the Model and 
Recommendations for Further Research
The competitive evaluation model was developed by using game 
theory concepts. Although applications of game theory have been 
shown in other areas, for instance, military, business, management.
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political science, etc., the idea of using game theory concepts to 
develop a methodology for the evaluation of water resources de­
velopment planning is relatively new if it is not the first try.
Since few references can be found for direct and ready adaption of 
game theory concepts to the evaluation of water resources develop­
ment planning, a major portion of this research was devoted to the 
development of the general model. As a result of this, although 
the main objective of the model has been essentially fulfilled, the 
application of the model is limited by the fact that a great deal 
more work is still needed before this model can be considered as a 
workable model with practical use for the evaluation of water re­
sources development planning.
To achieve practical application of this model for the eval­
uation of water resources development planning, it is necessary to 
define more detailedly the evaluation criteria used to head the sets 
of games in the model. The four evaluation criteria introduced in 
this study were only for illustration proposes and they do not make 
up a complete evaluation. More evaluation criteria should be intro­
duced and also justified if a complete evaluation is required. This 
means that more aspects related to water resources development should 
be considered, for example, cost, social objectives, ecological ob­
jectives, etc.
Several weighting factors were introduced in this model. The 
strategy priority weighting factor which is designed to bring out the 
priorities of various types of development in a basin was not developed
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in the verification of the model; hence, the development of this 
weighting factor should be considered in the future study. Although 
an experimental basin priority weighting factor was developed in 
this study, further sensitivity analysis of the effect of this 
factor on the game value should be done. The objective priority 
weighting factor introduced in the model for bringing out the rela­
tive importance of different evaluation criteria was not developed. 
When the set of complete evaluation criteria has been defined and 
comparison of game values from different sets of games is needed, 
it is necessary to develop the objective priority weighting factor.
Only a limited post-sensitivity analysis of the effect of 
the UNS's magnitude on the game value as well as a limited post­
sensitivity analysis of the whole model have been done in this study. 
Hence, more effort should be spent in these areas if future research 
is pursued.
Another possible improvement of the model is to develop a 
methodology for comparing or combining game values from different 
evaluation criteria. Although all the CPM's and game values shown 
in the verification of the model were computed by computer, it would 
be more effective if comparisons of these game values could also be 
made directly by computer. This could be another area for future 
research.
Although the competitive evaluation model was formulated 
with its application in the evaluation of water resources development
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planning in mind, the development of the model was done in a very 
general format and, thus, the structure of the model is general 
enough to permit handling evaluation in other areas. For example, 
this model could be used to handle evaluation in transportation de­
velopment planning by obtaining comparison information from games 
arranged between players representing different regions while 
different modes of transport or different transport facilities being 
employed as strategies in the competition. The model could also be 
used to handle evaluation in fields like housing, education, public 
health, urban planning, or a combination of such fields.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY
The main purpose of this study was to develop a more ef­
fective evaluation methodology for assisting in water resources de­
velopment planning. The new model was contemplated for solving 
some of the problems existing in the present practices of water 
resources development planning. Two of the principal problems as­
sociated with the present practices were the considering of indiv­
idual development as isolated entity and the using of the benefit 
and cost ratio as the only analysis in the evaluation process. A 
study of some cost-effectiveness techniques, decision theory and 
game theory, and the heuristic (operational) gaming approach as 
well as their possible applications for water resources development 
planning evaluation led to the development of the model. The 
model was finally developed by stressing game theory concepts. The 
principal tactics employed in the model are the competitive mea­
suring between benefit categories and the competitive evaluation of 
the outcomes.
The mode] is basically a collection of sets of games. Its 
structure is quite flexible. Each set of games is headed by an in­
dividual criterion. All evaluation criteria can be considered as 
eq u ally  weighted entries of the model; otherwise, an objective priority
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wcightint» factor can be used to bring out the relative rankings 
among criteria. Under each evaluation criterion, there is a scries 
of games used to obtain comparison information between different 
types of water resources development in different locations. All 
games are formulated in a two-person non-zero-sum game format.
When comparison is needed, individual game can be arranged for two 
players, which can be used to represent two water resources basins 
while traditional g;aue strategies being used to represent various 
types of water resources development. In general, strategies are 
used to designate different aspects on which comparison is needed 
to be made. All strategies can be considered to be equally impor­
tant; if not, a strategy priority weighting factor can be used to 
show the preference. By using a competitive measuring process, the 
utility number of a strategy (UNS), which measures the absolute pay­
off of a strategy, is used to procure the coefficients of the payoff 
matrix (CPM) which in turn are used to compute game values by em­
ploying the algorithm of taking average expected value. These game 
values are then multiplied by their respective basin priority 
weighting factor before they are compared and analyzed, and, then, 
used as bases for formulating recommendations to be considered in 
the decision making process.
In the verification of the model, four evaluation criteria 
which measure the long-term total objective, the five year (1972- 
1976) short-term objective, the percent of effectiveness, and the 
percent of needs met, were introduced to head the sets of games in 
the model. Eighteen water resources basins in the United States
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were designated as basin-players so that the comparison information 
of water resources development planning between these basins could 
be obtained. The nation as a whole was also introduced as a player, 
the nation-player, to serve as an intermediary for obtaining in­
direct comparisons between these basins. A game was arranged for 
each basin-player and the nation-player in each set of games headed 
by an evaluation criterion. Strategies employed by each player were 
various types of water resources development represented by benefit 
categories. No strategy priority weighting factor was developed.
Data were collected so that utility numbers of different strategies 
(IJNS) under each of the four evaluation criteria can be obtained. 
These UNS's were used to procure the coefficients of the payoff ma­
trix (CPM) which in turn were used to compute the game values. All 
the computations of the CPM's and game values were done by computer. 
An experimental basin or game priority weighting factor was developed 
and applied to the original game values. The weighted game values 
were then compared and analyzed under each evaluation criterion.
Based on these game values, recommendations for water resources de­
velopment planning in basin level were discussed. Mo attempt was
made to analyze any game value when all four evaluation criterion 
were considered simultaneously, and, hence, no objective priority 
weighting factor was developed. Finally, an illustration of a 
simple sensitivity analysis was done.
To support the main objective, some sub-objectives of the
model have also been accomplished. These sub-objectives enable the 
model to identify the overall system of water resources development
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as well as the individual or local development, the relationship 
of developments in different locations, the inter-relationship be­
tween different purposes of development, and the priorities among 
different purposes and locations of development. The model also 
recognizes the competitive nature of water resources development 
and augments some new measurements. The structure of the model is 
quite simple as well as the computation techniques involved. The 
model is not an optimization formulation which would indicate how 
exactly water resources should be planned. The model as a whole 
provides a new approach to obtain systematic and specific recommend­
ations for the decision-maker.
The main advantage of the evaluation method used in this 
model, as compared to the benefit and cost ratio analysis which is 
traditionally used in water resources development evaluation, is 
that more measurements and objectives, whether quantifiable or non- 
quantifiable, can be introduced in the evaluation process besides 
the economic factors based on benefits and costs. Although many 
details of this model are based on Senate Document No. 97, e.g., 
benefit categories and basic planning units - basins, the evaluation 
method used in this model is more an analytical approach. As com- 
]iarod to the present practices in planning, no water resources de­
velopment is considered in isolation in this model; i.e., the rela­
tionships of any individual development with the overall system and 
with any other component of the system are considered.
The limitation of this model at the present is that detailed 
and practical application still needs further refinement. This
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means further research on the application of weighting factors, the 
assigning of utility number to non-quantifiable objective, detailed 
formulation of evaluation criteria furthei; post-sensitivity analysis, 
and the methodology for comparing and combining game values, etc.
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Flood damage reduction, 
existing development, 
urban
Flood damage reduction, 
existing development, 
rural
Flood damage reduction, 
future development, 
urban







15 Increased land use, urban
Increased land use, rural
Definition of Project Output
Acreage, shown as urban in the 
City and County Data Book which 
receive protection from the 
proposed project.
Acreage, not designated as urban 
in the City and County Data Book 
which would receive protection 
from the proposed project.
Financial benefits only for 
areas classified as urban in the 
City and County Data Book which 
would receive protection from 
the proposed project and on 
which development is expected to 
occur with or without construc­
tion of the proposed project.
Financial benefits only for areas 
not designated as urban in the 
City and County Data Book which 
would receive protection from the 
proposed project, and on which 
development is expected to occur 
with or without construction of 
the proposed project.
Financial benefits only for areas 
classified as urban in the City 
and County Data Book which would 
receive protection from the pro­
posed project and on which de­
velopment or higher level of use 
is expected to result from con­
struction of the proposed project.
Financial benefits only for areas 
not designated as urban in the 
City and County Data Book which 
would receive protection from the 
proposed project, and on which 
development or higher level of use 
is expected to result from con­
struction of the proposed project.
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Code Category
[Control of Water Damage] 
17 Drainage
18 Bank and channel 
stabilization
19 Beach Erosion
21 Hurricane damage re­
duction, existing 
development, urban
22 Hurricane damage re­
duction, existing 
development, rural











Definition of Project Output
Acreage, classified by Soil Con­
servation Service as a wetness 
problem area, which would be re­
lieved of wetness problems through 
project construction.
Acreage which would be preserved 
for beneficial use by provision 
of measures to restrict erosion 
and/or channel meander.
Miles of beach which would be pre­
served for beneficial use by pro­
vision of measures to restrict 
erosion or to restore eroded areas.
Acreage subject to inundation from 
the standard project hurrican, 
which would receive protection from 
the proposed project and is expected 
to qualify as urban in accordance 
with the definition furnished.
Acreage subject to inundation from 
the standard project hurricane, 
which would receive protection from 
the proposed project and is not ex­
pected to qualify as urban in ac­
cordance with the definition fur­
nished.
Financial benefits only for acreage 
subject to inundation from the 
standard project hurricane, which 
would receive protection from the 
proposed project and is expected to 
qualify as urban in accordance with 
the definition furnished and on 
which development is expected to oc­




[Control of Water Damage]









26 Flood damage reduction, 10 Acres 
tributaries existing de­
velopment, rural
27 I'lood damage reduction, 
tributaries future de­
velopment, urban
Definition of Project Output
Financial benefits only for 
acreage subject to inundation 
from the standard project hur- 
ficane, which would receive pro­
tection from the proposed pro­
ject and is expected to qualify 
as urban in accordance with the 
definition furnished and on 
which development is expected 
to occur with or without pro­
tective measures.
Acreage bounded by the conflu­
ence of two streams and subject 
to flooding from more than one 
direction, which wihtin the 
time frame used for projection 
of needs is expected to qualify 
as urban in accordance with the 
definition furnished. Acreage 
reported under this category 
consists of areas requiring pro­
tection provided by projects 
along both streams and duplicates 
acreage reported under flood 
damage reduction, urban.
Acreage bounded by the conflu­
ence of two streams and subject 
to flooding from more than one 
direction, which within the 
time frame used for projection 
of needs is not expected to 
qualify as urban in accordance 
with the definition furnished. 
Acreage reported under this 
category consists of areas re­
quiring protection provided by 
projects along both streams and 
duplicates acreage reported 
under flood damage reduction, 
rural.
Financial benefits only for acre­
age bounded by the confluence of 
two streams and subject to flooding 
from more than one direction, which
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Code Category









Municipal and industrial 
water supply






Definition of Project Output
within the time frame used for 
projection of needs is expected 
to qualify as urban in accordance 
with the definition furnished and 
on which development is expected 
to occur with or without protec­
tive measures. Acreage reported 
under this category consists of 
areas requiring projection pro­
vided by projects along both 
streams and duplicates acreage 
reported under flood damage re­
duction, urban.
Financial benefits only for acre­
age bounded by the confluence of 
two streams and subject to flooding 
from more than one direction, which 
within the time frame used for pro­
jection of needs is not expected to 
qualify as urban in accordance with 
the definition furnished and on 
which development is not expected 
to occur with or without protective 
measures. Acreage reported under 
this category consists of areas 
requiring protection provided by 
projects along both streams and 
duplicates acreage reported under 
flood damage reduction, rural.
Service yield of proposed project 
(dependable yield times reuse 
factor).
Acreage which could be brought, into 
productive use or would be more 
productive if the proposed project 
were constructed.
Dependable yield of proposed pro­
ject .
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Code Categoxy ^Units Definition of Project Output
41 Commercial fisheries Tons Tons of increased catch
[Recreation] 
51 General
52 Fish and wildlife
53 Boating-launched
54 Boating-berthed
10^ uda Annual user-days of water ori­
ented recreation, not specifical­
ly reported under fish and wild­
life or boating, expected to be 
satisfied by the proposed pro­
ject after the initial five years 
of project operation.
10^ uda Annual user-days of recreational
fishing or hunting to be satis­
fied by the proposed project 
after the initial five years of 
project operation.
10^ uda Annual user-days of recreational
boating, using boats transported 
by trailer or car-top, to be sat­
isfied by the proposed project 
after the initial five years of 
project operation.
Boats Number of recreation boats which
could be permanently or semi­
permanently moored at facilities 
developed as a result of construc­
tion of the proposed project.
[Nav i gat ion] 
61 Harbors
03 Deep draft channels
10® Tons Projected annual tonnage to be
Comm. benefitted as a result of and
within five years of construction 
of proposed project.
10® Ton- Projected annual tonnage to be bene-
Milcs Comm, fitted as a result of and within
five years of construction of pro­
posed project times length of pro­
posed project.
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66 Deep draft locks
67 Shallow draft locks
68 Navigation safety
10^ Ton- Projected annual tonnage to be 
Miles Comm, benefitted as a result of and
within five years of construction 
of proposed project times length 
of proposed project.
Financial benefits attributed to 
reduced maintenance dredging, re­
ducing delays, etc., will be re­
ported under this category. No 
physical measure now required.
10® Tons Projected total annual tonnage
locked through the locks of the 
subject waterway, shown as the 
sum of the tonnage for each lock.
10® Tons Projected total annual tonnage
locked through the locks of the 
subject waterway, shown as the 
sum of tonnage for each lock.
Average annual benefits ($1000) 
resulting from reduction in ac­
cidents, elimination of vessel 
damage and cruising hazard, loss 
of cargo, cost of clean-up and 
related costs associated with 
providing safer navigation facil­
ities. This does not reflect the 
value of loss of life or personal 
injury prevented.
[Power]
71 Power capacity-peaking 10® KW
72 Power capacity-base
73, Downstream Power Benefits
10® KW
Proposed project installation 
for peaking capacity.
Proposed project installation 
for base load capacity.
Financial benefits resulting 
from increased generation at 
downstream plants attributed to 
flow regulation by proposed pro­
ject. No physical measure now 
required.
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Code Category OutputUnits Definition of Project Output
81 ARA Benefits
82 Regional Development 
Benefits
Financial benefits accruing 
to a geographical area as a 
result of the projects. In 
order for this category to be 
used it is necessary for the 
affected area to be designated 
as an EDA county by the Economic 
Development Agency.
Financial benefits accruing to a 
geographical area as a result of 
the project which stimulate or 
induce a growth in income not 
directly attributable to any 
other benefit category and which 
do not provide national benefits.
91 Other Financial Benefits Financial benefits which are not 
attributable to any other offi­
cial benefit category (i.e., mine 
drainage pollution abatement, 
dust reduction, etc.). A typed 
explanation sheet identifying 
the type benefit by project 
must be provided with the listing 
and punch cards when this cate­
gory is used.
A P P E N D I X  I I  
R E G I O N A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  O B J E C T I V E S
*The benefit categories corresponding to the code numbers indicated 
here are shown in Appendix I.
®Thc basic measurement units of different types of development ac­
cording to benefit categories are shown in Appendix I.
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11 1,849 350 406.23 74,508
12 24,998 3,201 25.20 35,329
17 7,927 377 2.75 2,707
19 1,068 428 17.0 7,613
25 15 4 91.0 239
26 8,183 1,082 5.13 3,543
31 6,404 2,275 12.29 34,836
32 7,580 153 15.43 6,066
34 24,948 5,446 6.99 42,022
41 647,878 65,960 0.08 8,033
51 1,554,311 181,944 0.94 118,340
52 156,139 9,584 1.23 17,040
53 94,059 3,358 1.76 5,419
54 613,070 69,719 0.21 11,724
61 708 56 105.18 19,623
63 4,575 243 27.24 8,945
64 36,415 4,112 8.65 77,309
67 21 3 147.61 2,847
71 18,143 3,033 19.32 51,255
72 3,780 536 30.11 11,959
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11 28 12 661.500 8,482
41 44,500 25,400 0.068 2,241
51 239 62 1.200 256
52 830 25 1.360 36
53 1,646 5 2.000 11
63 582 50 119.850 265
64 95 1 86.788 192
142































11 26 34 436 3,758
12 2,346 771 24 7,503
17 248 62 8.449 598
31 1,134 157 14.824 2,508
32 148 23 55.152 1,551
34 4,787 3,583 6.278 19,476
41 483 280 0.209 35
51 45,409 5,047 0.980 4,434
52 2,065 1,116 1.042 943
53 3,680 54 1.407 96
71 3,586 85 19.154 1,411
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11 552 57 541.360 4,570
12 1,193 94 77.436 1,712
17 92 3 17.453 134
31 214 151 22.720 1,358
32 342 45 46.407 3,298
34 63,000 450 0.089 57
41 59,864 1,584 1.144 3,553
51 7,890 144 1.153 488
52 4,789 160 1.780 816
53 101,500 1,700 .487 786
71 50 50 36.160 1,808
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11 190 12 115.630 763
12 2,934 28 23.845 219
32 48 6 167.170 995
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11 69 5 426.180 988
12 522 83 47.745 3,445
17 287 2 8.966 10
19 86 5 35.238 299
51 72,048 235 1.469 396
52 7,950 95 2.795 250
54 29,782 1,432 0.195 145
64 1,256 6 20.038 1,094
71 5,305 2,509 10.064 38,742
72 975 536 19.269 11,959
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11 65 22 187.430 1,237
12 252 19 1.976 53
31 99 9 71.277 717
51 11,400 792 .987 790
52 1,570 30 1.250 40
53 650 95 1.030 130
147































11 45 22 436.000 3,512
12 55 1 32.900 9
19 321 38 2.677 340
31 82 6 28.059 103
34 1,929 84 12.129 318
41 1,925 1,032 0.122 146
51 135,147 4,962 0.956 4,088
52 12,572 972 1.780 1,503
53 5,768 355 6.860 204
54 28,553 15,366 0.091 2,589
61 20 4 57,442 1,131
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11 8 0.488 305.41 436
51 14,810 300 1.464 335
53 101 90 2.590 256
54 6,750 5,430 0.253 1,242
61 2 1 377.040 737
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12 1,292 126 10.931 158
17 5,161 283 2.0 1,941
25 15 4 93 056 239
26 8,183 1,082 5.132 3,543
3] 504 68 6.062 139
32 759 79 2.722 222
34 393 168 1.747 322
51 42,407 350 1.431 350
52 2,430 202 1.700 620
63 218 89 31.679 2,291
64 877 920 7.092 4,996
150































11 54 39 514.200 6,577
12 617 191 34.826 3,703
31 107 42 6.750 586
34 423 71 12.060 1,102
51 20,064 6,986 1.000 5,130
52 4,330 1,642 0.921 1,449
151































11 231 28 749.280 13,817
12 1,600 32 79.622 2,766
19 351 201 15.505 4,707
31 951 370 12.384 6,212
34 4,290 564 9.607 8,804
41 57,220 21,865 0.069 2.143
51 258,203 107,441 0.551 45,334
52 13,071 636 1.278 1,339
53 28,227 234 1.740 1,207
54 200,340 29,240 0.150 6,069
Ô1 88 29 104.44 5,431
63 2,167 104 4.291 6,389
71 4,251 89 23.943 1,955
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11 265 22 226.940 7,279
12 3,809 239 28.900 5,160
31 768 451 19.510 12,497
34 8,976 504 6.064 8,335
51 166,167 7,941 1.360 15,594
52 38,532 421 544 890
53 17,785 1,235 1.162 2,504
64 11,190 3,020 11.449 54,195
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11 4 2 938.360 2,825
12 18 5 413.160 15
31 50 29 28.436 759
52 20 9 1.495 7
61 1 0 524.59 320
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11 14 10 436.000 348
31 23 2 19.259 148
51 4,228 193 0.435 173
52 423 60 3.117 54
155































11 3 3 576.000 1,972
12 586 313 3.176 677
17 392 24 1.448 26
51 400 29 1.473 29
52 166 3 1.214 5
53 93 7 1.444 6
156






























11 176 22 113.820 2,435
12 3,439 865 5.168 1,088
19 142 174 34.230 2,049
31 1,522 770 4.068 2,291
34 1,276 370 4.639 1,903
51 323,651 30,493 1.149 23,580
52 5,375 1,149 1.384 1,955
53 11,270 205 1.596 141
54 73,585 6,761 0.121 129
61 18 18 459.200 8,323
64 1,521 50 8.287 720
71 300 300 22.658 7,339
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11 76 42 244.040 3,976
12 5,576 107 11.323 782
17 268 6 3.927 131
31 455 184 12.326 5,611
34 88 65 9.816 637
41 5,000 2,554 .164 430
51 261,028 4,247 .557 7,342
52 14,740 2,022 1.032 5,929
61 29 4 186.220 3,681
64 3,526 61 4.554 1,634
158































11 12 10 510.22 6,045
12 640 266 23.441 7,119
51 136,714 8,422 .812 4,408
52 43,155 1,035 1.399 1,479
64 11,988 54 1.739 14,414
67 21 3 147.62 2,847
APPENDIX III
UTILITY NUMBER OF STRATEGY (UNS) 
UNDER EACH EVALUATION CRITERION
*The benefit categories corresponding to the code numbers indicated 
here are shown in Appendix I.
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11 751,137 74,508 19.0 9.9
12 629,988 35,329 12.8 5.6
17 21,863 2,707 4.8 12.4
19 18,170 7,613 40.1 41.9
25 1,377 239 30.4 17.4
26 42,001 3,543 13.2 8.4
31 78,756 34,836 35.5 44.2
32 117,022 6,066 2.0 5.2
34 174,403 42,022 21.8 24.1
41 52,491 8,033 10.2 15.3
51 1,463,435 118,540 11.7 8.1
52 192,349 17,040 6.1 8.9
53 166,152 5,419 3.6 3.3
54 130,963 11,724 11.4 9.0
61 74,471 19,623 7.9 26.4
63 123,272 8,945 5.4 7.3
64 315,253 77,309 11.6 24.5
67 3,100 2,847 11.9 91.8
71 350,551 51,255 16.7 14.6
72 113,835 11,959 14.2 10.5
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Table TIT-1. Basin No. 1 (Alask^ utility number of strategy (UNS)
























11 18,522 8,482 42.9 45.8
41 30,260 2,241 5.7 7.4
51 287 256 25.9 89.3
52 1,129 36 3.0 3.2
53 3,292 11 0.3 0.3
63 69,813 265 8.6 0.4
64 8,288 192 0.5 2.3
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Table III-2. Basin No. 2 (Arkansas-White-Hed) utility number of 
























11 11,336 3,758 132.6 33.2
12 56,297 7,503 32.9 13.2
17 2,095 598 25.1 28.5
31 16,816 2,508 13.3 14.9
32 8,162 1,551 15.5 19.0
34 30,051 19,476 74.9 64.8
41 101 35 58.0 34.7
51 44,501 4,434 11.1 10.0
52 2,152 943 54.1 43.8
53 5,178 96 1.5 1.9
71 68,686 1,411 2.4 2.1
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Table III-3. Basin No. 3 (California) utility number of strategy (UNS)
























11 298,955 4,570 10.3 1.5
12 92,381 1,712 7.9 1.9
19 1,606 134 3.3 8.3
31 4,862 1,358 70.5 27.9
32 15,871 3,298 13.2 20.8
41 5,607 57 0.7 1.0
51 68,482 3,553 2.6 5.2
52 9,097 488 1.8 5.4
53 8,524 816 3.3 . 9.6
54 49,430 786 1.7 1.6
71 1,808 1,808 100.0 100.0
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Table III-4. Basin No. 4 (Colorado) utility number of strategy (UNS) 
























11 22,028 763 6.2 3.5
12 69,961 219 1.0 0.3
32 8,084 995 12.4 12.3
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Table III-5. Basin No. 5 (Columbia-North Pacific) utility number of
























11 29,432 988 7.5 3.4
12 24,920 3,445 15.8 13.8
17 2,573 10 0.6 0.4
19 3,041 299 5.6 9.8
51 105,839 396 0.3 0.4
52 22,220 250 1.2 1.1
54 5,807 145 4.8 2.5
64 25,160 1,094 0.5 4.3
71 79,915 38,742 47.3 44.5
72 18,787 11,959 55.0 63.7
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Table III-6. Basin No. 6 (Great Basin) utility number of strategy 
























11 12,183 1,237 33.8 10.2
12 498 53 7.5 10.6
31 7,056 717 9.5 10.2
51 11,252 790 6.9 7.0
52 1,962 40 1.9 2.0
53 1,081 130 9.0 12.0
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Table III-7. Basin No. 7 
(UNS) under
(Great Lakes) ut 
each evaluation

























II 19,838 3,512 47.8 17.7
12 1,797 9 2.4 0.5
19 859 340 12.0 39.6
31 2,301 103 7.9 4.5
34 23,403 318 4.4 1.4
41 235 146 53.6 62.3
51 129,201 4,088 3.7 3.2
52 22,378. 1,503 7.7 6.7
53 39,568 204 6.2 0.5
54 2,598 2,589 53.8 99.2
61 1,140 1,131 20.3 99.2
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Table III-8, Basin No. 8 (Hawaii utility number of strategy (UNS) 
























11 2,565 436 5.6 17
51 21,682 333 2.0 1.5
S3 261 256 89.1 98.2
54 1,708 1,242 80.4 72.7
61 792 737 40.5 93.1
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Table III-9. Basin No. 9 (Lower Mississippi) utility number of 
























12 14,128 158 9.7 1.1
17 10,321 1,941 5.5 18.8
25 1,377 239 30.4 17.4
26 42,001 3,543 13.2 8.4
31 3,057 139 13.6 4.5
32 2,067 222 10.4 10.7
34 687 322 42.6 46.9
51 60,685 350 0.8 0.6
52 4,131 620 8.3 15.0
63 6,906 2,291 40.8 33.2
64 6,218 4,996 104.9 80.2
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Table III-IO. Basin No. 10 (Missouri) utility number of strategy
























11 27,818 6,577 73.0 23.6
12 21,488 3,703 30.9 17.2
31 720 586 39.7 81.4
34 11,276 1,102 16.9 21.6
51 20,064 5,130 34.8 25.6r 3,988 1,449 37.9 36.3
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Table III-ll. Basin No. 11 (North Atlantic) utility number of 
























11 172,732 13,817 12.3 8.2
12 127,435 2,766 2.0 2.2
19 5,441 4,707 57.3 86.5
31 11,589 6,212 38.9 53.6
34 41,212 8,804 13.1 21.4
41 3,948 2,143 38.2 54.3
51 142.270 45,334 41.6 31.9
52 1,339 1,339 4.9 8.0
53 49,116 1,207 0.8 2.5
54 30,051 6,069 14.6 20.2
61 9,223 5,431 33.1 58.9
63 9,298 6,389 4.8 68.7
71 101,777 1,955 2.1 1.9
----------- f-—
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Table III-12. Basin No. 12 (Ohio) utility number of strategy (UNS)
























11 60,107 7,279 8.2 12.1
12 110,067 5,160 6.3 4.7
31 14,976 12,497 58.8 83.4
34 54,432 8,335 5.6 15.3
51 225,987 15,594 4.8 6.9
52 20,961 890 1.1 4.2
53 20,666 2,504 6.9 12.1
64 128,114 54,195 27.0 42.3
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Table III-13. Basin No. 13 (Puerto Rico) utility number of strategy 
























11 3,554 2,825 50.0 79.5
12 7,272 15 26.1 0.2
31 1,422 759 58.0 53.4
52 51 7 44.9 22.8
61 687 320 5.3 46.6
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Table 111-14. Basin No. 14 (Rio Grande)utility number of strategy 
























11 5,899 348 73.2 5.9
31 435 148 8.4 33.8
51 1,839 173 4.6 9.4
52 1,318 54 14.2 4.1
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Table III-15. Basin No. 15 (Souris-Red-Rainy) utility number of 
























11 2,004 1,972 77.6 98.4
12 1,861 677 53.5 36.4
17 568 26 6.2 4.7
51 589 29 7.2 4.9
52 201 5 2.1 2.7
53 135 6 7.5 4.7
175
Table III-16. Basin No. 16 (South Atlantic-Gulf) utility of strategy 
























11 20,089 2,435 12.7 12.1
12 17,773 1,088 25.1 6.1
19 4,861 2,049 122.5 42.2
31 6,191 2,291 50.6 37
54 5,919 1,903 29 52
51 371,875 23,580 9.4 6.3
52 7,439 1,955 21.4 26.3
53 17,987 141 1.8 0.8
54 8,904 129 9.2 1.5
61 8,312 8,323 99.4 100.1
64 12,608 720 3.3 5.7
71 6,797 7,339 100.0 108.0
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Table III-17. Basin No. 17 (Iexas-Gulf)utility number of strategy 
























11 18,571 3,976 55.6 21.4
12 3,142 782 1.9 1.2
17 1,052 131 2.2 12.4
31 5,614 5,611 40.4 99.9
34 859 637 74.3 74.2
41 820 430 51.1 52.4
51 145,393 7,342 1.6 5.0
52 15,212 5,929 13.7 39
61 5,400 3,681 . 13. A 68.2
64 16,058 1,634 1.7 10.2
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Table III-18. Basin No. 18 (Upper Mississippi) utility number of 
























11 6,046 6,045 86 100
12 15,012 7,119 41.6 47.4
51 111,012 4,408 6.2 4.0
52 60,374 1,479 2.4 2.5
64 20,847 14,414 .4 69.1





General Description of the Model
The objective of the model was to find the most efficient 
way of allocating federal funds for meeting the nation's future 
need for water resources development. The model is composed of two 
levels, the national level and the basin level. At the basin level, 
returns from different funding levels are calculated for different 
benefit categories. Returns are measured by the percentage deduc­
tion in deficits, i.e. the amount of need satisfied. The maximum 
return for each funding level is derived from an integer programming 
computation. Next, the output from the basin level model is used as 
input for the national model. Integer programming is again employed 
to obtain optimal returns for different national budgets. Thus, for 
each budget level the distribution of investment for each basin can 
be derived. This also provides a guideline for allocating funds to 
individual water projects according to benefit categories.
The Basin Level Model 
Basic Formulation
The objective of the basin model is to minimize the sum of 
the water deficits in each benefit category for a given budget, B.
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For each benefit category, i, [here exists a set of returns,
Rij, derived from deficit, where the subscript j refers to the magnitude 
of the deficit. Corresponding to a return, R^j, is a cost, Ĉ j. The 





n  V i j - '1 J
(2)
y X.. = 1, for each i (3)j 1]
X. . =
ij
1, if Rĵ4 appears in the optimal objective function
(4)
0, otherwise.
The first constraint, equation 2, simply states that the sum 
of the costs, corresponding to the chosen return or deficit levels in 
each benefit category, must be equal to or less than the available budget. 
Constraint two, equation 3, states that one return must be chosen for 
each benefit category. The third constraint, equation 4, states that 
each activity variable, X^j, associated with return R^j, must be a 
zero-one integer, which indicates that a project would either appear as 
a whole or not appear at all.
The objective function, equation 1, assumes that the returns 
are the optimal minimum ones for each benefit category when all the 
benefit categories are simultaneously considered under a certain budget, 
In other words, one can obtain the best way, measured by minimizing
180
deficits, to spend a certain budget among different benefit categories 
from this formulation. Several budgets will be introduced for each 
basin. The outputs will then be used as inputs for the national level 
model.
Summary
The diagram shown in Fig. IV-1 indicates how the basin level 
model is operated. From Fig. IV-1, it can be noted that the four 
main entries are return , cost C^j, activity variable X^j, and 
budget B.
To arrive at , needs are predicted for each benefit cate­
gory in each basin first. Needs are designated as goals which are 
then converted from percentages into units less than or equal to 1. 
Returns r^j are next obtained from deficits and an exponential 
function y = b*, where b is a constant and x is the deficit unit.
Two weighting factors, the expense weighting factor 6.. and the bene-C13
fit priority weighting factor are then multiplied by r^j to get 
the adjusted return Rî  = X.é ..r...•' l^Cl] 1]
Cost is derived for each benefit category from general­
ized relationships with respect to geographical area and type of 
improvement. Activity variable X^j is a zero-one integer which will 
equal to 1 if the return associated with it appears in the optimal 
solution and zero otherwise. Budget B is a capital constraint.
With all these components, Rjj, C^j, X^j, and B on hand, the 
basin model can then be operated to derive the optimal solution for 
each budget in each basin.
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Figure IV-1. Operation of Basin Level Model
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model. Solutions from the basin model wül be used as inputs for the nation:-'! 
level model. The results From the basin model will be listed according
to l>asin, year, budget, and corresponding optimal total return. These
data are then used as injiut for the national model.
National Level Model 
The national level model is essentially similar to the basin 
level model with the exception that the benefit categories for each basin 
are replaced by the basins.
basic Formulation 
The national level model is also based on integer programming.
Tiie basic mathematical formulation can be stated as follows:
Mi ni mi  z e
n.'x R. (1)
I t  ■ ■
subject to
I I B X -L P (2)
i j ■'
) X. . .-1 1, for each i (31
t  1 )
1
X. .I I
I, if R.^ appears in the optimal 
0, otherwise
where
Rjj - return from basin i and budget j
Ilii = basin budget associated with return Rĵ j
P - national budget level
Xjj = activity variable for basin i and basin budget j.
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As in the basin model, the first constraint, Eq. (2), simply 
states that the sum of the basin budgets, corresponding to the 
chosen returns for the optimal level, must be limited by the nation­
al budget, P. The second constraint, Eq. (3) indicates one return 
must be chosen for each basin; and constraint three, Eq. (4), shows 
that , which represents return for basin i and basin budget 
j, must be an integer less than or equal to 1, i.e., one and only 
one return for each basin.
Considering all the basins simultaneously for a certain na­
tional budget, the objective function, Eq. (1), will assume that re­
turns from each basin are the optimal minimum.
Summary
Compared to the basin level model, the national level model 
is relatively simple. Figure IV-2 shows how the national model 
operates.
As is noted, the four main entries are basin budget Bjj, ad­
justed return R.., national budget P, and activity variable X...ij b > / 1]
Basin budget B.. is obtained from the basin level model with
the associated return r . w h i c h  is adjusted to R.. = 6.r.. by the1] IJ 1 ij
basin priority weighting factor 0̂ . P is the national spending al­
lowance for the basins under consideration. Activity variable X^. 
is the same as in the basin level model, except that i represents 
basin and j the basin budget instead of benefit category and deficit 
as in the basin model.
The optimal solution in the national level model is the list
I-------1
j Basin j 






for basin 1 and 
budget pendingj








for a national 
budget
Activity





j Provide guidlines 
> for budget 
I allocation
Figureiv-2. Operation of National Level Model
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of minimum returns associated with a corresponding basin budget.
This can be used to show how a certain national budget can be dis­
tributed among different basins more effectively with all of the 
basins being considered simultaneously (i.e., all of the basins 
are more closely interrelated).
Conclusion
Figure IV-3 shows how the whole model operates. First, in 
the basin level model the projected needs for each basin according 
to benefit categories are converted into deficits and, then, into 
returns associated with the cost of development which appears in the 
output of the basin level model as an optimal minimum. The national 
level model is introduced next. With outputs, returns and corre­
sponding basin budgets from the basin level model, the national level 
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Figure IV-3, Operation of the budget allocation model.
